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Abstract
The financial crisis in 2008 enlightened several shortcomings in the perfor-
mance of the banking sector. As a result of this a more rigid regulatory
framework, Basel III, has been developed which raises the requirements of
banks’ capital and liquidity structure and internal capital adequacy processes.
This involves evaluating potential future risks related to the strategy and risk
appetite of a bank. Therefore it is crucial that a bank has an understand-
ing of how their business plan would affect the balance sheet under different
economic scenarios.
The goal of this study is therefore to demonstrate how this can be imple-
mented by using quantitative projection methods, incorporating important
risk factors such as yield curves, credit spreads and default probabilities. The
projections involve the development of a deterministic mathematical model,
based on credit migrations, under which business plans can be tested and
evaluated under scenarios based on historical downturns such as the recent
financial crisis.
The evaluation is done by incorporating four key risk metrics into the
model followed by a study of the results from the risk metrics using balance
sheet data from an American bank. These risk metrics are considered under
three different scenarios and four proposed business plans. Risk appetite
targets and limits are defined where a breach serves as an indication to the
bank that the business plan should be revised.
The results show potential risks involved in the different business plans
and supports a modest growth of the current balance sheet and a sound
balance between trading and lending activities in order to stay within limits
under severe scenarios. The conclusion is that the model can serve as a base
for setting a risk appetite framework at a bank, but in order to validate key
assumptions and robustness of the results a more thorough investigation with
access to bank data is needed.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
The fundamental purpose of a bank is the provision of long term financing
to the real economy. This is done through borrowing from customers in the
form of deposit taking or from wholesale markets and transforming this short
term debt into long term debt by lending to businesses and individuals. By
standing in the middle of these transactions the bank takes on credit risk,
and by transforming the duration of debt it takes on liquidity risk. In order
to balance the level of these risks against the risk capacity of the business
it is vital that the bank understands how they will evolve over time and in
different economic scenarios and how this evolution can be affected by the
business plan.
The evaluation of the recent financial crisis in 2008 showed some critical
shortages in the behavior of the banking sector. One main reason for the crisis
was that banks in many countries had built up excessive on- and off-balance
sheet leverage. Combined with a weaker capital base and insufficient liquidity
buffers, the banking sector was unable to take care of larger exposures of the
off-balance sheet and the systemic trading and credit losses that occurred
when the crisis was at hand. This led to a degeneration in the market’s trust
of the banks and in the end this was transmitted to the whole economy. Due
to this turn of events, a new and stricter framework for regulating risks taken
by banking institutions was developed in the form of Basel III[1].
The lack of stability in the banking world during the crisis showed the
importance of assessing that enough capital is covering the risks of banks.
With an uncertain future where many scenarios could potentially undermine
the capital base of a bank, it is crucial to have a process in place that captures
these issues. This can be done by incorporating business plans into scenario
building and stress testing through projections of a bank’s balance sheet[2].
It is an important part of Basel III and is specified under Pillar II.
The model developed is deterministic and is based on credit migrations
and discounting principles. Through constructing a mathematical model
based on credit migrations and through implementing this in a tool where a
bank can project its assets and liabilities, this thesis provides a risk appetite
framework under which a bank can evaluate and quantify the future risks of
its current business plan.
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1.2 Aim of thesis
The goal of this thesis is to demonstrate how quantitative projection methods
can be used to challenge a bank’s business plans and ensure that the risk
taking activities of the bank do not exceed its risk capacity. The projection
methodology will be to consider asset and liability allocations, incorporating
both business plans and the effect of key risk drivers. By considering a
number of scenarios, reflected in the projection through stressed risk drivers,
we see how risk appetite limits can be used to limit or promote risk taking
activities in order to ensure the continuing financial strength of the bank and
the fulfillment of the sharpened requirements in Basel III.
Key metrics are defined to be used in a risk appetite framework and
both tolerances and limits for these metrics are defined. These metrics are
projected quarterly over a five year time horizon based on balance sheet
and required capital projections across a number of extreme but plausible
scenarios. If the limits are breached in any of these scenarios then the risk
appetite is considered to be breached and the business plan should be revised
to avoid excessive risk in the company. A number of alternate business
strategies are investigated, such as an aggressive growth agenda and a focus
on trading assets on the balance sheet and show that the performance of the
risk metrics shows a clear differentiation between the impacts of the strategies
on the financial strength of the company in adverse scenarios.
2
1.3 Outline
The thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the background and
focus of Basel III and the definition and idea behind risk appetite and how
it can be operationalized. Section 3 describes some of the most important
risks under Basel III. Section 4 describes the structure of a bank’s balance
sheet. Section 5 describes how the projections of the balance sheet are done
with explanations of chosen risk metrics and risk factors. Section 6 describes
different business plans and under which scenarios those are tested. Section
7 shows the results. Section 8 concludes. Section 9 discusses further im-
provements. An overview of the different parts and how they are connected
can be seen in figure 1.
Figure 1: Overview of the different parts of the thesis.
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2 Basel III
2.1 Basel Accords - History
The first Basel accord was created in 1988 by the Basel Committee of Banking
Supervision, a committee established by the Central Bank Governors of the
Group of Ten (G-10) in 1974. With this an important step towards an
international minimum capital standard for banks was taken. However, it
can be concluded that many of the approaches in Basel I were far too coarse
and failed to measure and aggregate risk sufficiently. It also failed in treating
the risk of derivatives, at that time a relatively new set of instruments that
had quickly gained popularity. The focus in the first accord was on credit
risk.
A second framework, Basel II, was introduced in 2004, again with focus
on credit risk. This time banks were allowed to choose between internally
developed approaches and certain defined standard methods to measuring
risk. The three-Pillar concept was introduced, with Pillar 1 subject to the
calculation of a minimum capital charge. The capital charge was calculated
for credit risk, market risk and operational risk. Pillar 2 was introduced as
the supervisory review process, which enhanced the importance of governance
of the banks’ internal assessments to their overall risk. In other words, that
sound management methods were in place and that enough capital (described
in Pillar 1) was allocated to the different risks. Pillar 3 was subject to public
disclosure of risk measures with greater insight to the risk management of
banks, in order to improve market discipline.
During and after the financial crisis in 2008 several shortcomings of Basel
II were revealed which led to the development of a third accord, Basel III.
Much of the framework of Basel II is the base of Basel III, with some im-
portant differences[10]. The structure of Basel III will be described further
ahead. An overview of the regulatory framework can be seen in figure 2.
2.2 Pillar 1 - Capital requirements under Basel III
One of the key lessons learned from the financial crisis was that many banks
had insufficient amounts of high quality capital. It was also revealed that
the definition of capital was different across jurisdictions, making it hard to
supervise if capital standards of the previous regulation framework, Basel II,
were to be appropriately met. In order to deal with these shortcomings Basel
III was introduced. The definition and views of the regulatory capital is, as
in Basel II, addressed in Pillar 1.
Regulatory capital is defined as the minimum requirement of capital that
4
Figure 2: Overview of the Basel regulatory framework[6].
a bank must hold to meet the demands for a sound risk assessment, set out by
the Basel Committee. In order to control whether banks have enough capital,
clear definitions of what can be counted as regulatory capital must be made.
The regulatory capital base of a bank is divided into two tiers, Tier 1 and
Tier 2. Tier 1 is divided into Common Equity Tier 1 (CET 1) and Additional
Tier 1. Common Equity Tier 1 mainly contains Shareholders’ Equity, which is
share capital (shares issued by the bank) and retained earnings[1]. Additional
Tier 1 is mainly subordinated debt. Tier 2 capital is going-concern capital
that is not incorporated into Tier 1. The precise definition of capital in Basel
is rather complex and follow certain accounting standards.
Before defining what capital requirements the different Tiers will have to
meet, an important concept, Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA’s), is introduced.
RWA is a way of weighting the different assets of a bank, where the weights
reflect how risky the assets are (the creditworthiness of the counterparty, e.g.
a government bond with high rating will give a low weight). The sum of
the notional exposures1 of the assets multiplied by the weighting coefficients
gives the RWA.
1Exposure is the maximum amount that will be lost if the counterparty defaults, i.e.
is unable to fulfill agreements, for example is unable to pay back a loan.
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Common Equity Tier 1 is subject to the Common Equity Tier 1 Capital
Ratio, and has to be a minimum of 4.5 % of the Risk-Weighted Assets by
January 2015. The earlier minimum requirement in Basel II, 2 %, is replaced
through a phase-in process by a requirement of 3.5% starting from January
2013. A threshold of 4% is introduced by January 2014. The Total Tier
1 Capital Ratio (Common Equity plus Additional Tier 1) will be, following
phase-in requirements in the same manner, ending in a requirement of 6% by
January 2015. Finally, the Total Capital Ratio (Tier 1+Tier 2) should be a
minimum of 8 % of the Risk-Weighted Assets at all times, which is the same
requirement as in both Basel I and II (see figure 3). In addition some assets
will be given higher weights than in Basel II, which will increase the capital
requirements.
Figure 3: Capital requirements in Basel III[1].
Certain changes to what can be considered as Common Equity Tier 1
are also introduced in Basel III, which also increase the capital requirements
and the demand of high quality capital. Additionally, a capital conservation
buffer is introduced, with a role of helping banks to absorb losses during
periods of severe stress. This buffer should be built up during good times to
prepare banks for recessions and stressful periods. This can for example be
done by allocating a part of the retained earnings to the buffer or reducing
the dividends pay-out at the end of the year. The minimum amount is 2.5%
of RWA’s and should be met exclusively with CET 1 capital, which means
that a total requirement of 7 % of CET 1 will be active in 2019. Starting from
2015 this will be phased into the minimum requirements. Banks that don’t
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meet these requirements will face restrictions on the usage of the retained
earnings during the following year.
A countercyclical capital buffer is also introduced to capture certain
macroeconomic factors that affect banks on a national level, i.e. it will ”re-
flect the geographic composition of its portfolio of credit exposures”[1]. The
buffer will vary between 0-2.5% of CET 1 and is in effect an extension to the
capital conservation buffer.
2.3 Supervisory requirements under Basel III (Pillar 2)
The second Pillar under Basel III gives guidelines on how banks should op-
erate in order to deal with the capital constraints in Basel III. There are four
main principles involved in this[8]:
• Banks should have a process in place that assesses their overall capital
adequacy with respect to their risk profile and a strategy for maintain-
ing their capital levels.
• Supervisors should review banks’ internal capital adequacy assessments
and strategies, as well as their capability to monitor their regulatory
capital ratios. If the results of the process do not meet relevant stan-
dards, necessary actions should be taken by supervisors.
• Supervisors should expect banks to keep levels above minimum regu-
latory capital ratios and be able to demand that banks hold capital
above minimum levels.
• Supervisors should at an early stage consider actions necessary to pre-
vent capital from falling below minimum levels required to support a
particular bank’s risk profile. If capital is not regained or maintained,
supervisors should require rapid countermeasures by the bank.
These principles are closely linked to operationalization of risk appetite. Sec-
tion 721 in Basel II[8] reads:
"The supervisory review process recognises the responsibility of bank manage-
ment in developing an internal capital assessment process and setting capital
targets that are commensurate with the bank’s risk profile and control environ-
ment. In the Framework, bank management continues to bear responsibility
for ensuring that the bank has adequate capital to support its risks beyond the
core minimum requirements."
How the methodology for this looks like is to a large extent up to the bank,
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even though some minimum regulations are set. The process is often referred
to as ICAAP (Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process) and the bank
should have methods for calculating their credit risk, market risk, operational
risk, interest rate risk and liquidity risk. Basel emphasizes that the ratios
set out in Pillar 1 are minimum requirements, and that banks should strive
for higher ratios in order to have a buffer against future crises. It also states
that the complexity of the models used under a bank’s ICAAP should reflect
the size and risk acceptance of the bank. There are a variety of suggestions
on how to deal with this in Basel III, ranging from crude estimates of the risk
types to some quite advanced models. The bank should be able to monitor
the level and trend of these risks and their effect on capital levels, as well
as evaluating continuously if key underlying assumptions are correct. It also
states that banks should be able to assess future capital requirements based
on it’s risk appetite and be able to see if strategic changes are needed in order
to be in line with the required and desired risk[8].
Stress testing is an important tool in risk management and is used by
banks as part of ICAAP. Stress testing is a way of testing how the bank
behaves under extreme but plausible scenarios and evaluating if it has enough
capital to cover those events. It should provide indications on how much
capital is needed to absorb losses during recessions. While stress testing for
market and interest rate risk has been done for several years, the credit risk
involved in the banking book (assets intended to be held to maturity) has
more recently come into focus.
Stress testing can differ a lot depending on the complexity and structure
of the bank and the models used vary a lot. It can be done by constructing a
tool that projects plausible future scenarios that are of interest to the bank,
using data and statistical modeling. It addresses unexpected outcomes and
relates these to the various risks. It should be an integrated part of the risk
management structure of a bank and link to risk appetite in a clear way[11].
2.4 Risk Appetite
Risk Appetite, which is the level of desired risk for a firm, is very impor-
tant to address for a bank. The weighting of risk versus return is one of the
core questions to identify for a company. For banks this is an issue that has
gathered a lot of attention over recent years, when the financial crisis showed
huge deficiencies in several banks’ ways of treating risk. The IIF( Institute
of International Finance) defines risk appetite as:
"Risk appetite is the amount and type of risk that a company is able and
willing to accept in pursuit of its business objectives." [4]
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Risk appetite is not the same as risk capacity, although risk capacity serves
as a regulation on how much risk a bank can or wants to take on. In other
words, it serves as an upper boundary of the measure of risk appetite. Risk
capacity is the amount of risk that a bank can bear given certain regulatory
capital constraints (Basel III), liquidity and borrowing capacity. Essentially
the bank has to determine which buffer it should hold, i.e. the difference
between risk capacity and risk appetite.
The hard part is not to state which level of risk that is desired for the
bank; it is how to link it to the business plan in an adequate way and to assess
and incorporate it in a consistent way throughout an organization. The views
need to be accounted for at a strategic, tactical and operational level. At
the operational level, this includes answering the question: How should risk
appetite be measured? This is a question that is often related to the specific
business, since so called KRI’s (Key Risk Indicators) are different across
different companies. For a bank, a Key Risk Indicator could for example be
the capital ratios that are defined in Basel, which could in case of a breach
warn a bank that insufficient amounts of capital are held. Identifying KRI’s
involves a process of analyzing where in the organization certain risks are an
issue, which often depends on the skills and goals of the different business
lines. It also includes identifying which underlying risk factors or risk drivers
contribute to the different areas of a bank. As stated earlier this is a part
of a process called ICAAP, which is a procedure that includes identifying,
measuring and aggregating risks across an institution, as well as following
regulatory standards set by Basel III and having a risk management system
that are meeting certain standards (also Basel, Pillar II)[7]. A part of this
management system for banks includes handling assets and liabilities on the
balance sheet, and projections (forecasts) of the balance sheet, with measures
of risk incorporated, as a way of analyzing which future risks could arise from
the current allocation of assets and liabilities, i.e. a way to operationalize
risk appetite.
Risk appetite is a quantitative statement, and therefore it is important to
define certain risk metrics that measures risk appetite in a good way. When
considering which risk metrics to use, one should:
• Define at least one core metric that is covering all relevant risk types
and business units
• Define metrics that are measurable and quantifiable
• Define metrics that provide the right measures, i.e. could be expressed
as targets
9
The optimal risk profile is often expressed as the risk target. The so called
risk limits are upper and lower bounds around the risk target, which is defined
in such a way that a breach of the limits serves as a warning to the bank that
some actions should be considered. The most risky approach of an upper
bound is the regulatory requirements in Basel[7]. Risk limits are a way of
defining what risk tolerance the bank has. Common risk metrics are Return
on Equity and Value-at-Risk.
Another key issue is how the business plans and the risk monitoring pro-
cesses are operationalized. This is a fundamental part of the risk appetite
framework - risk appetite loses its value if it isn’t connected to a robust and
ongoing monitoring process where it is evaluated through appropriate mea-
sures and then is followed up if it breaches the risk appetite limits of the
firm.
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3 Relevant risks under Basel III
Basel III defines which different types of risk are critical to deal with and
how the risk quantification processes should be approached. The framework
is described in the sections below.
3.1 Credit risk under Basel III
Credit risk is the oldest risk type to be dealt with in terms of regulatory re-
quirements for banks. It was the core risk type of Basel I and has continued
to be so in the following versions. Credit risk is the risk of loss caused by
a borrower or counterparty’s failure to repay or meet a contractual obliga-
tion. When this is happening, it is said that the counterparty is defaulting
on it’s loan or contract. It can also be stated as the risk of a change in
portfolio value due to changes in the creditworthiness or credit quality of
one or several counterparties. The biggest difference between Basel II and
III regarding credit risk is the CCR derivative exposure (counterparty credit
risk derivative exposure) which adds a capital charge for default risks related
to derivatives, e.g. CVA (credit valuation adjustment) which compensates
for the cost of potential mark-to-market losses in credit quality migrations
of counterparties. Another change is higher capital requirements for securi-
tization products, which can be for example mortgage-backed securities or
asset-backed securities.
The Basel Committee let banks choose between two methodologies for
calculating capital requirements for credit risk. They are the standardized
approach and the internal ratings-based approach.
The standardised approach divides assets into ”risk weight buckets”, re-
flecting the risks of the assets. How to allocate the assets to the different
buckets is determined by some external rating, for example S&P or Moody’s
credit rating systems. In the cases where an external rating isn’t available,
the bank should estimate the risk-weight of the counterparty in question. The
summation of exposures multiplied by risk weights then gives the RWA’s that
are used in calculating the capital requirements for credit risk.
The internal ratings-based approach (IRB) is the second approach and
it is divided into F-IRB (foundation) and A-IRB (advanced). Under the
foundation-based approach banks use own estimates of Probability of Default
(PD), but use regulated values for Loss Given Default (LGD), determined by
the Basel Committee. The advanced approach can be used by banks that de-
rive their own Probability of Default (PD), Exposure At Default (EAD) and
Loss Given Default (LGD) estimates of the assets in the portfolio. Sometimes
also an effective maturity (M) needs to be determined. If the Probability of
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Default is lower than 0.03%, the bank has to use 0.03% as the PD number.
These estimates are then used as inputs to formulas specified in Basel to de-
termine the credit risk capital charge. Depending on which asset class, like
corporate, sovereign or banks, different formulas are applied. One example
is

R = 0.12 ·
(
1−e−50·PD
1−e−50
)
+ 0.24 ·
(
1− 1−e−50·PD1−e−50
)
b = (0.11852− 0.05478 · ln(PD))2
K =
(
LGD · Φ
(
(1− R)−0.5 · Φ−1(PD) +
(
R
1−R
)0.5
· Φ−1(0.999)
)
− PD · LGD
)
·(1− 1.5 · b)−1 · (1 + (M− 2.5) · b)
RWA = K · 12.5 · EAD
where the outputs are:
R - asset correlation,
b - maturity adjustment, in years
K - capital requirement
RWA - risk-weighted assets
The origin of these formulas will not be explained in detail in this thesis,
but they are based on an asymptotic single risk factor model, derived from
a Merton/Vasicek model. Summing the results from the calculations for the
different assets gives the total credit risk capital charge. The credit risk
charge is applied to the banking book, i.e. for assets that are intended to be
held to maturity. It is reflecting the risk of holding a portfolio for one year
and at a 99.9 % confidence level.
3.2 Market risk under Basel III
The definition of market risk is "the risk of losses in on- and off-balance-sheet
risk positions arising from movements in market prices"[9]. While the first
Basel accord had a clear focus on credit risk, it was obvious to the Basel
Committee that market risk had to be captured more thoroughly. Therefore,
in 1996 in the so called Amendment to Basel I, two different methods for
market risk capital charge calculation were introduced. The first one was
a formula-based standardized model, and the second was referred to as an
internal model (i.e. a model developed by the bank itself). The basis for
measuring market risk in Basel is Value-at-Risk, a measure developed by
JPMorgan in 1993. Value-at-Risk will be described in more detail later.
There were not many changes in the Basel II framework compared to the
Amendment.
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At the time of the Amendment, most banks’ trading books consisted of
quite simple instruments that could be traded in liquid markets. Since then
a rapid increase of more complex instruments with a larger degree of credit
risk exposure has been seen and created many questions around the feasibility
of the treatment of market risk in Basel. To deal with these shortcomings,
an additional capital charge intended to capture default risk was introduced
in the so called Basel 2.5, called IRC (Incremental Risk Charge). Also, a
stressed VaR component was added to capture the risk under stress scenarios.
The Basel Committee also advises banks to opt for using expected shortfall
instead of Value-at-Risk[9].
By definition in Basel, the market risk capital charge is applied only
to the trading portfolio. The trading portfolio consists of instruments that
are intended to be traded or are used to hedge other assets that are trade
intended.
Before describing the standardized and the internal methods, an intro-
duction to Value-at-Risk follows below.
3.2.1 Value-at-Risk
Value-at-Risk has been used in a frequent manner in risk management ever
since it was introduced in 1993. Since it plays a central part in the Basel
accords, it needs to be explained in more detail.
Let’s say it is of interest to study the potential losses of a portfolio of
risky assets, and that a loss is denoted by L. The probability function for
the loss, which can be denoted by FL(l) = P (L ≤ l), is constructed for a
predetermined time period. The Value-at-Risk of the portfolio is then, at
confidence level α ∈ (0, 1), the smallest value l so that the probability of the
loss L exceeding l is no larger than (1− α). This can be expressed as
V aRα = inf{l ∈ R : P (L > l) ≤ 1− α} = inf{l ∈ R : FL(l) ≥ α}. (1)
This can in words be expressed as "the maximum loss which is not exceeded
with a given high probability"[10]. One serious drawback of this is that VaR
doesn’t say anything about the size of the losses beyond this threshold. It
only states the probability of exceeding it. Another core point of Value-at-
Risk is the question of coherency. VaR violates one of the properties that
is required in order to be defined as a coherent risk measure. The property
is the subadditivity principle, which says that if two portfolios are added,
with L = L1 + L2, the Value-at-Risk for the new portfolio should be less
than or equal to the sum of the VaR for the two old portfolios calculated
separately, i.e. V aRα,L ≤ V aRα,L1 +V aRα,L2 . The violation of this property
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creates a contradiction in terms of the diversification benefits when adding
two portfolios.
3.2.2 Standardized method and internal model
Depending on the quality of the model used to quantify risks of the trading
desk, a bank may or may not use an internal model. It is the supervisory
authorities of the bank that make this decision. If the authorities judge
that the model used by the bank doesn’t assess and quantify the risks in a
granular way, it will require the bank to use the standardized model. The
four minimum requirements can be expressed as:
• A sound and integrated risk management system should be in place
• Sufficient number of skilled staff, not only in trading area but also in
other areas of the bank
• A history of accurate risk measurements
• Stress tests are done on a regular basis
Basel states that a standardized model serves two purposes. First, for small
banks it can be unnecessary to have a complex business model, and therefore
the use of a standardized model is preferred. Second, if the model of a bank
fails, the standardized model serves as a backup plan in order to calculate
the capital charges.
The standardized model was revised in Basel 2.5 and suggests two dif-
ferent approaches: the partial risk factor approach and the fuller risk factor
approach. The partial risk factor approach divides assets with similar risk
attributes in the trading book into different buckets and applies a risk weight,
that is determined by Basel, to the market value of the asset in question. In
the fuller risk factor approach, assets are mapped to certain risk factors spec-
ified by the Basel Committee and then calculates the capital charge when
risk factor shocks are applied. It requires the bank to use it’s own pricing
models when setting the market value of a specific instrument[9].
The minimum capital requirement consists of two separate charges, one
called ”specific risk”, which involves risk factors related to the specific issuer
of an instrument, and the other ”general market risk”, which captures market
interest rate risk.
The total capital charges account for interest rate related assets and eq-
uities, plus FX and commodities risks, and those are independent of whether
the asset is held in the trading book or the banking book.
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The base for the internal models is Value-at-Risk, and therefore the in-
ternal models often are referred to as VaR-models. Before Basel 2.5, the
minimum standard for market risk was (evaluated on a daily basis) to de-
rive Value-at-Risk at a 99% one-tailed confidence interval, with a minimum
holding period of ten days. The historical time period to sample from should
be no less than one year. The market risk (MR) capital charge (RC) for
the internal model (IM) is calculated as the higher of its previous day’s VaR
number and an average of daily VaR for the last 60 days, as
RCtIM(MR) = max
(
V aRt,100.99 ,
k
60
60∑
i=1
V aRt−i,100.99
)
+ CSR, (2)
where a multiplication factor, k, with a value between 3 and 4 is used. This
factor reflects the quality of the internal VaR model, and is determined by
backtesting the current model to see if it previously calculated VaR numbers
reflect the loss at the 99th percentile (i.e. in average one exceedance over 100
days). The second term, CSR, aims to capture specific risk. This formula
still applies after Basel 2.5, but two additional charges have been developed,
namely the stressed VaR component and the IRC component. The sum of
the three gives the internal models total capital charge for market risk. The
stressed VaR is calculated in the same manner as the regular VaR, but uses
stressed market conditions as base for the calibration (the historical time
period to sample from)[15].
The third capital charge component, IRC, is added as a way of capturing
both default risk and credit migration risk within the trading book. It is
calculated on a one-year horizon, with a 99.9% confidence level (consistent
with formulas for the credit exposures in the banking book). The reason
for adding this charge is mainly due to the fact that the other two charges
do not capture liquidity risk in the trading book, which was a phenomenon
observed during the financial crisis in 2008.
Under the internal model approach, banks may use whatever method they
think is appropriate. The three most common methods are the variance-
covariance method, historical simulations and Monte Carlo simulations.
3.3 Operational risk under Basel III
Operational risk was introduced in Basel II and has kept its original design
in Basel III. In Basel, operational risk is defined as ”the risk of loss resulting
from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from
external events”[8]. In this definition legal risk is included but strategic and
reputational risk are not. To give a historical example of a large operational
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loss, one can take the British bank Barings, that went bankrupt in 1995 due
to a single trader, Nick Leeson, loosing $1.3Billion on a so called straddle.
An overview of operational risk in Basel III can be seen in figure 4.
Figure 4: An overview of operational risk in Basel III[8]
In Basel there are three approaches to measuring operational risk and
they are the Basic Indicator Approach (BIA), The Standardized Approach
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(TSA) and the Advanced Measurement Approaches (AMA).
3.3.1 The Basic Indicator Approach (BIA)
The Basic Indicator Approach is the most simple way of measuring oper-
ational risk in Basel. It requires banks to hold a fixed percentage, α, of
the average of the last three years of (positive) annual gross income. Gross
income is net interest income plus net non-interest income. Any negative
income should be excluded when calculating the average. This creates a
problem if a bank has three consecutive years of negative gross income (the
denominator is zero), and the supervisors will then consider appropriate su-
pervisory actions. The percentage (α) is decided by the Basel Committee
and is equal to 15 %. This method gives a higher capital charge than the
other approaches, to create an incentive for banks to move towards more
advanced methods. The formula is
KBIA =
∑3
i=1 max(GIi, 0) · α
n
(3)
where
KBIA = the capital charge under the Basic Indicator Approach
GIi = annual gross income for year i
n = number of previous three years for which gross income is positive
α = 15%
3.3.2 The Standardized Approach (TSA)
Under The Standardized Approach, the bank is divided into eight business
lines, which are corporate finance, retail banking, agency services, asset man-
agement, trading and sales, commercial banking, payment and settlement
and retail brokerage. A capital charge is then calculated for each line indi-
vidually and then a summation of these is done to get the overall operational
capital charge. The method for calculating the individual charge for each
line is similar to the Basic Indicator Approach. Different percentages are
determined by the Basel Committee for different lines, and they range from
12 to 18 %. If the summation of the charges in one year is negative, it will
be taken out of the calculation. The formula is
KTSA =
(
3∑
i=1
max
(
8∑
j=1
(GIi,j · βj, 0
))
/3 (4)
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where
KTSA = the capital charge under The Standardized Approach
GIi,j = annual gross income for year i and business line j
βj = fixed percentage for business line j
3.3.3 The Advanced Measurement Approaches (AMA)
The AMA method involves a development of a bank’s internal operational
risk measurement system. This means that the bank uses its own model to
estimate the operational risk charge. AMA is subject to supervisory approval.
There are several requirements, as the use of both internal and external data
in the model and the use of scenario analysis. The bank must be able to
demonstrate that the model captures potential severe tail loss events. It
also has to show that the output plays an integral part in the everyday risk
management processes of the bank[8].
3.4 Liquidity risk under Basel III
During the financial crisis, it became clear that liquidity risk was a risk
needed to be taken care of in a better way. Liquidity risk is stemming from
the fact that banks tend to finance their long term lending by short term
borrowing. For example, a bank may use commercial paper with a 30-day
maturity from one company to fund a one-year loan to another corporation.
When the 30-day commercial paper expires, the bank signs a new agreement
in order to continue to fund the loan. The risk involved in this is if the
bank starts experiencing financial trouble (or perhaps is just perceived as
having it), it will have difficulties to get the needed funds, simply because
the counterparty, in light of the worsening economic state of the bank, no
longer has a willingness to make a lending agreement. During the crisis,
banks could have no problem meeting its capital requirements, but still face
issues with liquidity. This was what happened to Lehmann Brothers in the
U.S. and Northern Rock in the U.K[28].
In order to deal with the shortcomings of the regulatory requirements
in Basel II, two liquidity ratios were introduced in Basel III: the Liquidity
Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). These
will be tested during a period and they could be modified, depending on the
evaluation of the trial period. LCR is planned to be implemented by 2015
and NSFR by 2018.
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3.4.1 Liquidity Funding Ratio (LCR)
The main goal with LCR is to test if a bank has the needed assets to survive
a 30-day period of severe liquidity dry-ups in the market. The period should
involve several stress parameters affecting liquidity: credit rating downgrades
by at least three steps, complete loss of wholesale funding, increased haircuts
on secured funding and a severe loss of deposits. The ratio is defined as
LCR =
High Quality Liquid Assets
Net Cash Outflows in a 30-day Period
(5)
and should be minimum 100 %.
3.4.2 Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)
The Net Stable Funding Ratio is introduced to ensure that the bank has
enough stable funding over a one-year period. It is defined as
NSFR =
Amount of Stable Funding
Required Amount of Stable Funding
(6)
and should be 100 % minimum. The way of calculating the denominator is to
apply weights to each asset, with higher weights for long term assets, assets
in the banking book and assets with lower credit quality, and sum the weights
multiplied by the exposures for all assets in the bank’s portfolio. This will
lower the ratio if the bank has less stable or less liquid assets. The way of
calculating the numerator is to apply weights to the different liabilities (the
funding of the bank) and in the same manner sum the weights multiplied by
the corresponding funding amount. Deposits will have a higher weight than
for example wholesale funding.
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4 Balance sheet structure
This section describes the basics of how a balance sheet of a bank can be
viewed and structured.
4.1 The balance sheet of a bank
The balance sheet of a bank can be described as a snap shot of the current
financial situation. A typical example of a balance sheet statement is shown
in figure 5. It is often divided into assets and liabilities (see figure 6), where
the assets, according to Basel regulatory views, usually are divided into a
banking book and a trading book. The banking book consists of loans and
mortgages, giving interest income to the bank. The assets placed in the
banking book are assets that are intended to be held to maturity. The trading
book consists of financial instruments, i.e. bonds, equities and derivatives
traded by the bank. Those assets are intended to be used for trading or as a
hedge of a trading asset.
The liabilities are divided into two parts, one containing Shareholders’
Equity, which includes share capital and retained earnings. The other part
consist of funding, divided into deposits and wholesale funding. Deposits
are seen as a stable source of funding, and involves paying interest to the
customers that holds money in the bank (the depositors). Often the deposits
aren’t enough to cover the loans of the bank and/or the trading activity, and
therefore a bank turn to wholesale funding, which can consist of borrowing
from the interbank lending market, having repo agreements or borrowing
from other financial investors. The distribution of deposits and wholesale
funding often depends on how much deposits a bank can get.
4.2 Assets
4.2.1 Banking book
The banking book is the main source of income for a retail bank2. It consists
of different loans; for example retail loans, corporate loans and retail mort-
gages. The interest rate determined for these loans are creating an income
for the bank. Retail loans are loans to private customers, corporate loans are
loans to larger firms, and retail mortgages are residential loans for private
customers.
2A bank which relies heavily on private (retail) customers, i.e. retail loans and stable
private deposits.
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Figure 5: Example of a balance sheet statement[32].
The risks involved in this part of the balance sheet are mainly credit risk
and interest rate risk. Briefly, one can say that the credit risk is the risk that
the counterparty of the specific loan will default (will be unable to pay back
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Figure 6: A coarse illustration of assets and liabilities of a bank.
the entire loan). The interest rate risk involves the risk of a reduction in the
forecasted net interest income coming from the loans [3].
4.2.2 Trading book
The trading book consists of all the financial instruments held and traded
by the bank. Typically, an investment bank has a greater focus on trading
income than a retail bank, but most banks rely on trading assets to some ex-
tent (seeking higher returns and profits). The assets can be different bonds,
like government, bank and corporate bonds, or equity and different types of
derivatives. Equity can be interpreted as stocks traded by the bank. Deriva-
tives consists of different contracts, like options and swaps, written on an
underlying asset.
The market risk is a major risk type when it comes to the trading book.
It is the risk of losses in the trading book affected by movements in various
factors determined by the market. Examples of such factors can be yield
curves, credit spreads and interest rates.
4.3 Liabilities
4.3.1 Shareholders’ Equity
Shareholders’ Equity can be viewed as the net worth of the bank. It is what
can be claimed by the shareholders when all the debt payments are done.
22
Shareholders’ Equity usually comes from two sources: share capital, which
is capital invested in the company by shareholders, and the accumulated
retained earnings. The formula for calculating Shareholders’ Equity is
Shareholders’ Equity = Total Assets− Total Liabilities (7)
Accumulated retained earnings are the accumulated amount of net profit
that has been made (when various costs, taxes and dividends have been
taken care of). The accumulated retained earnings can both be negative and
positive, depending on how the bank’s business is doing. Net profits each
year are added to the accumulated retained earnings. If net profits for one
year are negative, no dividends are normally being paid out and net profits
are equal to annual retained earnings. It could be the case that the bank still
pays out dividends, since annual retained earnings are losses (or gains) for a
single year. The bank can use the accumulated amount of retained earnings
to pay out dividends. This is however not a sustainable strategy.
4.3.2 Deposits and Wholesale funding
The deposits of a bank are often seen as a quite stable source of funding. For a
retail bank, deposits are the main funding base. It is different types of private
savings accounts, where some have a fixed term before withdrawal can be
made and some can be withdrew immediately. Deposits are a liability to the
bank because it borrows the money from customers and pays an interest in
return. The bank also provides services (debit cards, access to cash machines
etc) in return for deposits, which have almost replaced the traditional deposit
rate.
Retail deposits, made by both consumers and small to medium-sized en-
terprises, are the primary way of self-funding for most banks. The deposits
are commonly insured by the government to a quite high level which lowers
the risk of a bank-run3. A bank also relies on wholesale funding for various
reasons, mainly because it can be hard to attract deposit customers.
Wholesale funding is a different way of obtaining cash (or cash equiva-
lents) and is often used when the deposits do not cover the loans and the
trades of the bank. It can be seen as a way of quickly raising liquidity. It is
often divided into long term and short term funding, depending on the ma-
turity of the loan, and these are in turn divided into secured and unsecured
3When financial instability occur and for example many retailers defaults on their loans,
this can create a domino effect where depositors withdraw their money at the same time.
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loans, depending on if collateral is used4. A secured loan can for example be
repo agreements, where the bank sells securities together with an agreement
to buy back the securities at a later point in time and pay interest during the
time of the contract. Effectively the security works as a collateral, and the
sale of the security as a cash loan. The collateral lowers the interest rate paid
to the buyer of the contract. Haircuts are often applied, where the haircut
reflects the riskiness, e.g. the price volatility of the collateral. For example, if
the bank chooses to collaterize a loan with government bonds, which can be
regarded as fairly safe, a high collateral, say 98%, is used. Then a 100 dollar
worth of government bonds as collateral gives 98 dollars in return. Another
way of obtaining wholesale funding is to lend from the interbank market,
where banks borrow money from each other in a mutual funding market at a
low cost. Other sources are covered bonds (long term bonds using mortgage
loans or public sector loans as collateral) and commercial papers (short term
funding without collateral, usually with maturity of 1-15 days)[5].
The type of risk that is the most crucial when it comes to wholesale
funding is liquidity risk, i.e. the risk of running out of liquid assets. This can
happen if too much of the assets are tied up as collateral in various funding
agreements or if the bank has too big portion of long term illiquid assets such
as retail loans, which would mean that those assets can’t be used to cover
losses under stressed market conditions. It can also happen when there is a
shortage of funding available on the market. This was one major cause of
the recent financial crisis.
4.4 Profit & Loss account
The Profit & Loss account keeps track of the income and expenses that have
occurred during a time period, and is a way of accounting for where on the
balance sheet money has been made (and lost). In other words, the retained
earnings during one time period are derived from the P&L account. The
earnings are added to the accumulated retained earnings, which are part of
Shareholders’ Equity, on the balance sheet. For example, if a loan is taken
by the bank on the interbank lending market, the value of the loan is shown
on the Liabilities side on the balance sheet, and the payments of interest are
shown as an expense on the Profit & Loss account. An example of a P&L
statement can be seen in figure 7.
4A collateral is working as a protection for the lender against the default risk of the
borrower. In case of default, the lender receives the collateral. It is often used in mortgage
loans, where the property serves as a collateral for the loan.
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Figure 7: Example of Profit & Loss statement[32].
4.4.1 Structure
The structure of a Profit & Loss account can be done as following. First, two
separate statements are done, one for income and one for expenses. Income is
coming from the assets of the bank, for example interest rate payments from
loan customers and dividends or coupon payments from equity and bonds.
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Expenses are for example interest rate paid to depositors and lenders. The
sum of these two will be the gross profit of the bank (assuming expenses
are accounted as negative values). After deductions of other expenses, such
as operating costs due to salaries and other costs for running the bank and
losses due to defaulting counterparties, the income before paying taxes is
calculated. If positive, a tax deduction is made, giving the net profit for the
time period. Then, after deductions due to dividend payouts, the retained
profits are obtained. This amount will then either be kept as cash or will
be reinvested in financial instruments, depending on the current business
strategy.
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5 The projections
An important part of the ICAAP process is capital planning, which is a
forward-looking analysis of the capital base and risks of a bank. It is a way
of testing the bank’s real capability to cover it’s future risks and to analyze
which risks are material[13]. This is done by projecting the balance sheet
under different scenarios which should cover extreme, but plausible, events.
5.1 Projections - main purpose
In order to determine if a bank has the desired risk appetite in its portfo-
lio and that it fulfills the capital requirements under different business plans
and scenarios, certain risk factors and risk appetite measures are applied and
incorporated into a capital planning tool where the balance sheet projec-
tions are made. The tool is implemented using Visual Basic for Applications
(VBA) in Excel (see Appendix D). Projections are a way of assessing possi-
ble future risks involved in following a certain business plan. Then studies
of how risk metrics behave under different scenarios are done. The main
purpose behind the tool is not to give exact forecasts of the future but to
investigate how different risk drivers affect the bank under different scenar-
ios. The main idea is to be able to study so called "what if"-scenarios, where
certain risk drivers are set to follow a deterministic path and then evaluate
how the impact is on the bank for different scenarios. The scenarios are based
on historical time periods that endured significant stress. This evaluation is
made by studying the movements of the balance sheet and by looking at the
measures of risk in the context of risk appetite limits. In order to determine
a scenario which is relevant to study, certain assumptions about correlation
between the risk drivers has to be made.
A simplified balance sheet of a bank described in section 5.3 will be used
when doing the projections followed by an analysis of the sensitivity to certain
risk factors, as for example the yield curve of bonds and the probability of
default for retail loans.
The following questions are investigated:
• How should the outputs be defined, i.e. what risk appetite measures
(risk metrics) are of interest?
• How should the inputs be defined, i.e. what risk factors should be
considered?
• How can interesting/plausible scenarios be constructed and evaluated?
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5.2 Risk metrics
Before looking at projections of a bank, it is crucial to define what the pro-
jections will be used for. The idea is to study certain business plans that the
bank is considering, and evaluate if the risk appetite limits are breached in
any of the proposed plans. Depending on what risk measures or KRI’s that
are of interest to the bank, it may require that the projections are modeled
in a certain way so that the KRI’s are able to be evaluated.
Since the main purpose of creating the tool is to operationalise risk ap-
petite, it is therefore a natural first step to consider what type of risk metrics
that are of interest for the bank, i.e. how the risk appetite should be mea-
sured. Also, it is of interest to define certain risk appetite targets and limits,
where a breach of those limits would serve as a warning to the bank that the
proposed business plan is too risky/risk averse and should be evaluated and
maybe changed.
5.2.1 CET 1 Ratio
It is of great interest to have a metric that reflects if the bank is meeting its
regulatory capital requirements set out by Basel. One way of doing this is to
study the ratio of CET 1 instruments divided by the RWA’s, and this defines
the first metric and is (at time t):
CET 1 Ratio(t) =
CET 1(t)
RWA(t)
. (8)
The formula for RWA in Basel is
RWA = Credit risk + 12.5 ·Market risk + 12.5 ·Operational risk (9)
where 12.5 is the reciprocal of 1
0.08
, which comes from the fact that 8 % is the
total minimum required capital (Tier 1+Tier 2) to hold for the bank. Credit
risk does not have this factor because it is already incorporated into the credit
risk formula (see section 3.1). It follows from this that the Risk-Weighted
Assets need to be projected, which involves projections related to credit risk,
market risk and operational risk. Also, the assets related to inclusion in CET
1 need to be projected, and those involve share capital and retained earnings.
The lowest possible limit for the bank to consider is of course the capital
requirements set out in Basel, which are described in section 2.2. The upper
limit is up to the bank to choose, depending on what the risk appetite of the
bank is. The reason for having an upper boundary is that holding too much
capital could mean that the bank misses investment opportunities that yield
a higher return. The upper limit is set to 15 % and the target is set to 10.5
%. The lower limit is set to the Basel requirements.
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5.2.2 Return on Equity (ROE)
The second risk appetite measure is capturing the appetite for large returns,
namely Return on Equity, which can be seen as the ratio between net profits
during a year and Shareholders’ Equity. ROE shows how well a bank uses
investment funds to generate growth. It is of great interest to have a measure
that is focusing on returns, since it is desirable to have a sound balance
between meeting the capital requirements and achieving good profit. Since
the projections are made on a quarterly basis the annualized ROE at time t
is calculated as
ROE(t) = 4 · Net profits(t)
Shareholders’ Equity(t)
. (10)
Net profits at time t are in the formula defined as the net profits made
during the previous quarter. Shareholders’ Equity is calculated as the average
of the value at the current time and the value a quarter of a year ago. The
limits are not regulated by Basel and should reflect the true appetite of the
bank. Typical target values are in the area of 15-20 %. An upper limit breach
could serve as a warning to the bank that it may have a too risky approach
(high returns are related to high risk). A lower limit breach should serve as a
warning to the bank that it is not making enough profit (or is losing money)
and should consider another business plan.
The bank (see section 5.3) will aim for a target of 17 % and will have
a lower and upper limit of 5 % and 29 %. The lower limit is motivated by
the fact that a bank would aim for positive earnings. The upper limit is an
estimate of what a bank could consider as returns that might imply excessive
risk taking, which would mean that the bank would need to evaluate other
risk metrics in order to determine if that is the case.
ROE cannot be used as a single risk metric, since it is dependent on the
leverage that the bank is exposed to. Increased debt and decreased equity
will increase ROE, and therefore it needs to be looked at together with a risk
metric that captures this. This is done by using the Leverage ratio.
5.2.3 Leverage ratio
One reason for the crisis in 2008 was banks’ build-up of excessive on- and
off-balance sheet leverage. Many banks were building up excessive leverages
that didn’t affect the capital ratios, thus this leverage effect wasn’t captured
by Basel II. Therefore a new ratio requirement was incorporated into Basel
III, which requires banks to have a minimum leverage ratio of 3%. It can be
seen as a measure of how dependent a bank is on debt financing compared
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to equity financing. The way of defining the leverage ratio in Basel III is:
Leverage ratio =
Tier 1 Capital
Total Assets
. (11)
The leverage ratio will be tested during a run period from 2013 to 2017
before being fully established. The lowest possible limit is defined by Basel
(3 %) but a more risk averse bank would choose a higher limit (relying more
on own capital). An upper limit would serve as an indication of the bank
being to careful in its investment strategy. The target level for the bank
presented in the next section is set to 8 % and the lower and upper limit are
set to 3 and 15 % respectively.
5.2.4 NSFR
The Net Stable Funding Ratio is implemented as a way of capturing the sta-
bility of the current funding compared to the asset structure. It is presented
in section 3.4.2. The lowest limit possible according to Basel is 100 % and
the upper limit could be set to what the bank thinks is a too risk averse
level. The target for the bank (presented in the next section) is set to 115
% and the upper limit is set to 135 %. The lower limit is set to the Basel
requirements.
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5.3 Constructing balance sheet for a simple bank
A somewhat simplified balance sheet is constructed in order to study the risk
appetite and balance sheet projections of a bank. The bank, called Bank J,
has the structure below (see figure 8). It is considered to be a bank with only
transactions within the country and a local customer base, eliminating (to
a certain extent) foreign exchange risk. The bank is situated in USA, and
the reason for this is mostly due to data availability. More details about the
assets and the projections of them will be explained in section 5.5. Before
doing that, a discussion of the risk factors involved in the projections will be
done.
Figure 8: Assets and Liabilities of Bank J.
5.4 Relevant risk factors
A change in a risk factor for a certain asset or asset group is something that
will affect the market price change of the asset in question. In other words,
the risk factors are determining the prices of the assets in the portfolio and
will therefore be used as inputs to the projections. They are a subset of
market variables that capture the risks of the portfolio. The risk factors
described in the following sections are incorporated into the model. Since
the scenarios will reflect historical periods, data for the risk factors involved
in these is also discussed. Due to proprietary reasons data is not available
for all risk factors. In these cases generic market data has been used instead.
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5.4.1 The yield curve
The yield curve is one of the most essential risk factors to consider for the
portfolio. The yield curve describes the relationship between a particular
redemption yield and a bond’s maturity. If the bond yields are plotted for
the different maturities the yield curve is constructed. It is important that
just one type of bonds is used when constructing the yield curve; for example
Treasury bonds. If assets traded at par are used, the yield curve is then
referred to as a par yield curve. If a bond is trading at par it is paying
coupons that make the market price of the bond equal to the face value (the
amount received at maturity). In the model it will be involved in the pricing
of both corporate and government bonds.
There are several yield curves to consider, for example the spot yield
curve and the yield to maturity (YTM) yield curve. The difference between
them is that the spot yield curve consists of yields for zero coupon bonds
and the YTM yield curve consists of yields for bonds with several coupons.
This difference mean that the YTM yield curve assumes that the coupons
received will be reinvested, thus introducing reinvestment risk[17]. The spot
curve doesn’t account for this risk as it only looks at bonds with one final
payment (for different maturities). The spot curve is also known as the term
structure of interest rates. It can be derived from the YTM yield curve and is
then called the theoretical spot yield curve. The yield curve is very interesting
as it holds information of the market expectation of future interest rates.
Historically there have been three typical shapes of the yield curve; up-
ward, downward and hump shape. The upward structure is the most typical
shape of the yield curve can be seen in figure 9. This is a quite intuitive
shape as an investor would expect to receive a higher yield for longer ma-
turity compensating for future inflation risk and the uncertainty of future
events. When the market predicts a recession the yield curve typically is
decreasing for the future period (downward shape) expected to have an eco-
nomic slowdown, and an example of this can be seen in figure 10, which
shows the average yield curve for U.S. Treasury bonds for the first quarter
in 2007, and it shows indications of a recession from 6 months to 2 years.
The reason for this is that the market expects future interest rates to drop,
which is often the case during recessions, where a decline in credit demand
drives rates down[27].
The data used for the scenarios is the U.S. Treasury yield curve derived
on a daily basis for maturities 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, 1 year, 2 years,
3 years, 5 years, 7 years, 10 years, 20 years and 30 years between the years
1990 to 2013 by the U.S. Department of the Treasury[33]. They use a cubic
spline model to estimate the at par yield curve for U.S. Treasuries using bid
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Figure 9: Yield curve for U.S. Treasury bonds, first quarter (average) 2013.
Figure 10: Yield curve for U.S. Treasury bonds, first quarter (average) 2007.
prices for U.S. government on-the-run securities. Quarterly averages of these
are formed to fit the projections. This yield curve is used as the risk-free
yield curve, which is based on the assumption that U.S. Treasury securities
have a low probability of default.
5.4.2 Credit spread of bonds
The credit spread of bonds is the extra risk that is involved in holding bonds
that have a probability of default. In addition to default risk, components
like liquidity risk and added tax obligations could affect the size of the spread.
There are several ways of defining the credit spread for bonds. The credit
spread is here defined to be the additional amount of interest paid by a
risky asset over the yield of a risk-free investment[18]. Primarily due to data
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availability this choice is option-adjusted spread (OAS). It is the percentage
that the fair value Treasury spot yield curve is shifted in order to match
the present value of discounted cash flows to the price of the bond[19]. A
illustration of the concept can be seen in figure 11. OAS is assumed to be
constant for all maturities, which is not often the case in reality.
Figure 11: Yield curve for U.S. Treasury, investment grade and junk bonds,
first quarter (average) 2013.
The OAS data is fetched from calibrations made by Bank of America and
Merrill Lynch for both U.S. investment grade[34] and junk bonds[35]. The
calibration method that is used is the Nelson-Siegel method[29], which is a
four-parameter formula that is updated iteratively through minimizing the
sum of squares of the price of the bonds and the fitted curve. The data is on a
daily basis ranging from years 1996 to 2013 and has been averaged quarterly
to fit the projection time periods.
5.4.3 Probability of Default
The Probability of Default (PD) is another important risk factor to consider,
and it will be described by both credit migration probabilities, which is the
probability of moving between certain pre-specified credit ratings, which re-
flects the credit quality of the issuer, and the probability of moving directly
into a defaulting state. The definition is stated in section 3.1. The default
probabilities and transition probabilities will be modeled by using Markov
matrices for both corporate bonds and retail loans.
The credit quality of the corporate bonds are modeled using credit ratings
provided by Standard & Poor’s (S&P). These ratings are divided into seven
different buckets ranging from AAA to CCC. Bonds are usually grouped as
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investment grade bonds, which are considered to be more safe and ranges
from AAA to BBB- and non investment grade bonds or junk bonds, which
are less safe and ranges from BB+ to CCC[20]. Depending on different
factors, as for example the current financial stability of the issuer of the bond,
different ratings are applied. The probabilities for the bond migrations will be
estimated using yearly data 1981-2011[36], which estimates the probability
of moving between investment grade and junk bonds and default state or
a withdrawal rating state. The withdrawal state means that the bond no
longer has a rating, but is not in default.
The estimation uses historical data of bonds to calculate the probability
of migrating or defaulting every year. To calculate the annual default rate
for the investment grade and the junk bonds, S&P divides the number of
defaulted bonds within a group during a year with the total number of bonds
in the same group. To get the credit migration probability, the end state is
compared to the starting state for each bond (for bonds with similar starting
state), and a summation of all transitions that has occurred is done and then
divided by the total number of bonds within the starting state group. For
example, to get the migration probability for one year for investment grade
bonds to junk bonds, the number of transitions (investment grade at start
of year and junk bond at end of year) from investment grade to junk bonds
is divided by the number of investment grade bonds at the start of the year.
Note that the estimation does not take into account if a bond has migrated
several times during a year; only the starting state and the ending state
matters. For example, an investment grade bond could migrate to a junk
bond at the beginning of the year, and then migrate back before the end
of the year. This will not be incorporated when calculating the transition
probabilities[22]. The method is called the cohort method and is the most
basic one when estimating transition matrices.
The transition matrix is adjusted by excluding bonds that have migrated
to a withdrawal state multiplied by a factor 0.5. For rating class i, it is
calculated as
Hi = Di/(Ni − 0.5 ·Wi) (12)
where Hi is the probability of default, Di is the number of defaulting
bonds during the period, Ni is number of bonds at the start of the period,
and Wi is the number of withdrawals during the period. This factor, 0.5,
represents the fact that a bond that has gone into withdrawal state at the
end of the year would probably have almost zero default risk. Thus, a factor of
1 would reflect a pessimistic view of the default probabilities. This method is
used by Moody’s[23] in their transition matrices. An example of a transition
matrix used by S&P is shown in figure 12.
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The matrix needs to be adjusted to fit quarterly time periods, and there-
fore a method for calculating the 4th square root of the matrix is applied. The
method is called Denman-Beavers iteration[24]. For further details regarding
this method, see literature.
Figure 12: Credit migration matrix from Standard & Poor’s. It shows the
average one-year transition probabilities during 1981-2011[36].
The retail loan portfolio is divided into high quality (low risk) customers
and low quality (high risk) customers. These groups can, in a way, be thought
of as investment grade bonds and junk bonds. The transition matrix is de-
scribing the probabilities of migrating between the different customer rating
classes and the probability of default. Difficulties arise in how to estimate
these probabilities, and banks often have their own assessment on the credit
quality of their private borrowers.
The probabilities will be based on industry benchmarks, provided by EY,
and a number of rating classes for different credit qualities will be divided into
two buckets, with approximately equal amount of customers in each group.
The estimated probabilities (on a quarter of a year basis) are shown in Eq.
13. When simulating the effect of a recession, the probability of default and
the downward migration probabilities will be doubled, as a way of stressing
the portfolio. The probability of staying in the same rating will be adjusted
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so that the sum of each row is equal to 1.
Q =
 98.7% 1.0% 0.3%1.1% 97.6% 1.3%
0 0 100%
 (13)
5.4.4 Equity Index
The equity portfolio of Bank J is assumed to be a well-diversified portfolio
with similar characteristics as S&P 500 equity index. The index corresponds
to 500 leading firms in various industries of the U.S. economy and is con-
taining 75 % of U.S. equities[14]. Data describing the daily index values is
fetched from Federal Reserve of St. Louis[37] and contains data from 1957
to 2013. The quarterly changes (using quarterly averages) in value of the eq-
uity index are assumed to describe a corresponding value change of the equity
portfolio for the bank. A sudden drop in market value of the index would
be considered as being a risk for the bank. The index using the quarterly
averages is shown in figure 13.
Figure 13: Quarterly average of the S&P 500 equity index 1957-2013.
The dividend payout coming from the equities is set to 2 % (yearly divi-
dend yield) for all scenarios, due to the fact that the dividend yield has been
quite stable in the two-percent area during the last ten years.
5.4.5 Exposure, volatility and correlation of yield curve, credit
spreads and equity
The volatility and correlation of all risk factors are important when modelling
the risks of a portfolio. However, since the market risk charge in Basel III,
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used as a part of the CET 1 ratio, is the only one of the projected risk
metrics that uses these inputs, it will be sufficient to model the volatility and
correlation of the risk factors involved in the pricing of the trading assets.
Since the market risk charge requires one year of historical data when cal-
ibrations are done, a rolling one year sample of the data sets (containing daily
samples) of the Treasury yield[33], the credit spreads[34][35] and the equity
index[37] is used. The yield curve volatility and correlation is estimated by
using the 3-month Treasury rate and the Treasury rate for a common longer
maturity, called target maturity (these two maturities are used for the bond
portfolio, see section 5.6.1). Since the model that is used for the market risk
charge will be the delta normal method (see section 5.8.1), which assumes
normality and a linear relationship between risk factors, the data for the
risk factors needs to be converted to a normal distributed form with zero
mean and constant dispersion. By assuming stationarity, one can do this by
constructing new vectors of risk factor changes, specifying the daily returns
for stocks and daily changes in yields and spreads. By introducing notations
y3m(t), ytarget(t), c1(t), c2(t) and S(t) for the 3 month Treasury yield, a Trea-
sury yield for longer maturity, the credit spread for investment grade bonds,
the credit spread for junk bonds and the equity index respectively, these are
defined as 
∆y3m(t) = y3m(t)− y3m(t− 1)
∆ytarget(t) = ytarget(t)− ytarget(t− 1)
∆c1(t) = c1(t)− c1(t− 1)
∆c2(t) = c2(t)− c2(t− 1)
∆S(t) = ln(St/St−1)
where ∆ is defined as one day. The volatility and the correlations are then cal-
culated every quarter (spanning from 1996 to 2013, due to data availability),
using the standard deviation during the last year and the Pearson correlation
(linear correlation) for the same period. This is a backward-looking estimate
of the volatility and the correlation and the estimation gives equal weights
to each sample during the last year5.
In order to derive Value-at-Risk for the portfolio the risk factors are
mapped to an exposure equal to the market value of the assets subject to
the risk factor. This is straightforward when it comes to the equity port-
folio, since the changes in market value of the portfolio has a one-to-one
relationship with daily returns. However, it is not as straightforward how a
one-percent change in yields affect the market value change of a bond. To
5For details on the estimated values, see Appendix A
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estimate this, the concept of modified duration is introduced. Modified du-
ration is the sensitivity in price as a function of the yield[28]. For a yield y
and a market value V, it is defined as
ModD(y) = −∂ ln(V )
∂y
.
In other words, a positive shift in the yield curve would correspond to a
negative shift in market value multiplied by a factor corresponding to the
modified duration. This linear approach is used for both corporate bonds
and government bonds. This means all risk factor changes affecting the
price of these assets; yields and credit spreads. The modified duration can
be expressed in terms of Macaulay duration, which is the average maturity
until cash flows are received. The Macaulay duration will be slightly smaller
than the maturity of a bond. This is because coupons are paid out before the
maturity date, thus giving a lower value of the average maturity of cash flows
compared to the maturity of the bond. The relationship between Modified
duration and Macaulay duration for bonds paying coupons k times a year
is[30]:
ModD(y) =
MacD(y)
1 + y/k
This will be used when calculating the Value-at-Risk for the exposures (the
value of the bonds) regarding changes in the yield curve and the credit
spreads. The target maturity is set to 10 years. The typical procedure
would be to map all cash flows to the corresponding maturity, as for example
the 10-year bond would have payments every quarter. Then a separate risk
factor would be present for each payment. To simplify things, all exposure
related to 10-year bonds will be mapped to the 10-year yield maturity risk
factor. For the 3-month bonds only one risk factor is needed from the yield
curve.
5.4.6 Loss Given Default (LGD)
Loss Given Default (LGD) is defined as the percentage of remaining debt
when default occurs that is expected to be lost. Since the assets exposed to
a probability of default in the model is the corporate bonds and the retail
loans, and these are divided into two risk buckets respectively, four different
LGD parameters are applied for these assets.
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Industry benchmarks suggests that an average exposure-weighted LGD is
around 30 %6, which is used as input when market conditions are assumed
to be normal. In a stressed scenario an LGD of 50 % is applied and that is
motivated by industry experience.
5.4.7 Loan rate
The loan rate is the rate at which banks offers loans to customers. Depending
on the credit quality of the customer, the length of the loan, the amount
(exposure) of the loan, if the loan is covered by collateral and if the loan rate
is fixed or floating different loan rates are applied. The loan rate can also be
linked to the strategy of the bank. For example, if the bank wants to attract
customers it may lower the rates as a strategic action (to win market shares).
If the bank feel that it is possible to gain more money by raising/lowering
the loan rate (optimal supply and demand), it will probably do so. There is
also an upper limit for how much the bank can charge its customers, since
there are rules and laws (e.g. Truth in Lending Act in the U.S.) that specify
what is considered to be a fair rate.
The bank using the tool is considered to be a small bank without any
significant impact on the market. The bank will therefore adjust its loan rate
to the current market conditions. The loans will be fixed-rate loans without
collateral. The loan rate for fixed-rate loans is affected by the current interest
rates. If the interest rate is low, the bank will probably offer loans with a
higher loan rate than for floating rate loans, since it is likely that the interest
rates will rise in the future. If not, this would imply a potential loss for the
bank, since the customer will have a lower loan rate than what the market
is offering in the future.
The value of the loans will be calculated by discounting the future known
cash flows of the loans (more about this in section 5.6.4). The discount factor
will be different for the different customer groups (described in section 5.4.3),
with higher discount factors for loans with lower credit quality. It will be
part both of calculating the value of the loans and when determining the
loan rate. The discount factor that will be used is the spread between the
prime loan rate and the federal funds rate. The federal funds rate is the rate
which banks borrow money from each other held at the Federal Reserve (the
central bank in the U.S.), typically overnight. The Federal Reserve controls
the federal funds rate by adjusting the level of Treasury bills that are issued.
The prime loan rate is an indicator of the interest rate at which banks are
lending to high quality customers[21] and is around 3 % above the federal
6Numbers are based on expert judgement using input from EY.
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funds rate. The prime loan rate is the base for other loans, such as credit
card loans, where for example a typical way of setting the interest rate for a
credit card loan is prime loan rate+x %.
The loan rate for high quality customers will consist of two parts, the
federal funds rate and the additional spread between the federal funds rate
and the prime loan rate. Effectively, the high rate customers will have a loan
rate that is the prime loan rate. The loan rate, rhigh, is:
rhigh = federal funds rate + (prime loan rate− federal funds rate)︸ ︷︷ ︸
discount factor
The low quality customers will be treated as credit card loan takers, be-
cause this type of loan often is associated with more risky customers. Using
that the average spread between all credit card loan rates issued by com-
mercial banks and the federal funds rate between 1995 and 2012 is around
10 %, gives a proxy for the discount factor that will be used for low quality
customers.
The loan rate will be the same for all maturities, but the effective interest
rate will be higher for loans with higher maturity. To see the logic behind
this, see section 5.6.4.
Data for the federal funds rate[38], the prime rate[39] and the credit
card rates[40] is fetched from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, which is the board of the central bank (Federal Reserve System) in
the United States. The historical data for the federal funds rate is plotted in
figure 14.
Figure 14: Quarterly average of the federal funds rate in the United States
1990-2013.
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5.4.8 Cost of wholesale funding
The cost of wholesale funding is the cost that banks is exposed to in order to
finance their business when core deposits is not enough (see section 4.3.2).
The wholesale funding for Bank J will be modeled as being funding received
from the interbank market, where banks borrow money from each other at
a low cost. This kind of funding is often short term (typically overnight or
three months) and there is no collateral protecting the bank.
The cost of funding depends on many factors, such as the current amount
of liquid funding available on the market, the maturity of the funding, the
current credit rating of the bank and the current credit rating of the country.
In the U.S. banks borrow from each other at the federal funds rate through
the Federal Reserve. It is also possible to borrow directly from the Federal
Reserve at a slightly higher rate.
When looking at funding costs the question of how to quantify liquidity
risk, resulting in a liquidity crisis similar to the one that happened during
the financial crisis, is an issue. Using historical values for the effective federal
funds rate, which decreased significantly before and during the crisis in 2008
due to attempts to stimulate the economy (lower rates creates incentives to
borrow money and invest) and cushion the fall, will not reflect a liquidity
crisis under a severe scenario. The actual funding cost under a severe scenario
is a difficult problem, due to both data availability and many different factors
affecting each other in an complex way[25]. The solution is to add a shock
parameter, based on the TED spread, which is the difference in percent
between the 3-month LIBOR and the 3-month Treasury yield. The TED
spread is a common indicator of the credit availability in the U.S. economy
and tends to rise when liquidity is an issue. The TED spread has historically
been on a level between 0.1 and 0.5 %, except in times of financial stress.
By applying a second spread, reflecting the current credit rating of the
bank, one could also simulate a potential downgrade as a consequence of a
stressed scenario such as the recent financial crisis. This spread is added
to the federal funds rate and is fetched from "The U.K. Financial Sector
Assessment Program"[16], which is a guidance document for stress testing
programs for banks. The spread is based on empirical estimates. Although
this document is for U.K. banks primarily, it is assumed that funding cost
spreads can be applied for an American bank as well. The applied spread
can be studied in Appendix B.
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5.4.9 Deposit rate and growth of deposits
The deposit rate is the rate that banks pay to there customers in return for
keeping money in the bank. The deposit accounts are assumed to be stable
and renewed on a short term basis. No risk for a bank run is considered, as
it is assumed that the customers are secured against a default of the bank.
The rate will be set to an annual percentage of 0.1-0.5 %, reflecting the low
deposit rate that has been paid out during recent years. The number is
estimated on the basis of expert judgement, provided by EY.
The growth of the deposits is set to follow the historical GDP (Growth Do-
mestic Product) in the U.S., motivated by research made on European banks
(Lakštutiene˙, 2008) that show a strong correlation between deposits and GDP
for well developed countries such as United Kingdom and Germany[26]. The
bank is assumed to maximize the amount of deposits possible under all busi-
ness plans, due to the desired stability and low cost of the funding source.
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5.5 Mechanics of the projections
This section describes the mathematical concepts behind the deterministic
model used for the projections of the assets and liabilities.
5.5.1 Time horizon
The time horizon for the projections are τ years, and it is a discrete horizon
with ∆ = τ/N , where N is the number of time steps, assumed to be a
multiple of τ , N = h · τ, h ∈ Z+. Then h is the number of time steps taken
each year. The horizon is therefore [0, τ ] with increments [t, t + ∆], where
0 ≤ t ≤ τ −∆. One increment will be referred to as one time period. The
model is looking at the risk factors that directly affects the market values
of the assets, and doesn’t look at macroeconomic influences. The following
sections will describe the projection process of one time period. The same
process is then done in the same way for all time periods. For the capital
planning tool, τ is equal to five years and the time steps ∆ are set to a
quarter of a year.
5.6 Assets
5.6.1 Corporate bonds
The risk factors directly involved in the market values of corporate bonds in
the model are:
• Probability of Default
• Loss Given Default
• Exposure At Default
• Changes and volatility of the risk-free yield curve
• Changes and volatility of credit spreads
The main idea behind the corporate bond projections is based on credit
migration techniques, with inspiration from the Jarrow-Lando-Turnbull
model[12]. The main similarity is the matrix concept and the difference
is that JLT converts the probabilities into risk-neutral probabilities using
the credit spread. In this approach each firm is assigned to a credit-rating
category at t = 0. The rating categories are finite and ordered by credit
quality. Transition matrices that describe the probability of moving between
different ratings over a fixed time period are constructed. Credit transition
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matrices are provided by rating agencies, for example Moody’s or Standard &
Poor’s (S&P) and they are based on historical data of defaulting companies.
The transition matrix, called P(t), that is used describes the probability
of jumping between three states (investment grade bond, junk bond and
default) during the discrete time period [t, t + ∆]. It is assumed that the
credit migration process follows a time-discrete Markov Chain and that the
transition matrix can vary through time. The default state is an absorbing
state. Let Xt define the credit rating of a bond at time t and X = {Xt, t =
0,∆, 2∆, ...}. The matrix is defined as
P (t) =
 p11(t) p12(t) p13(t)p21(t) p22(t) p23(t)
0 0 1
 (14)
with pij(t) = P (Xt+∆ = j|Xt = i).
The yield curve of a default-free zero-coupon bond is assumed to be en-
tirely described by y(t, T ), where t is the current time and T is the time to
maturity. When valuing a risky bond, such as a corporate bond, the price
must be lower because the investor wants to be compensated for taking a
higher risk. This is referred to as the risk premium or the credit spread, and
it is assumed to be entirely described by ci(t, T ) for company i. The recovery
rate is assumed not to affect the current market value of the bonds. If the
coupon payments are assumed to be taking place at every discrete time-point
and are denoted Di, and the face value paid out at maturity is denoted fi,
then the present value of the bond is (Ti > 0)[10]:
vi(t, Ti, Di, fi) =
(
h·Ti∑
j=1
Di
(1 + y(t, j/h) + ci(t, j/h))j/h
)
+
fi
(1 + y(t, Ti) + ci(t, Ti))Ti
. (15)
This formula is the standard way of receiving the fair value of an asset through
discounting promised payments. Ti is updated for every time step, where
an increase in t corresponds to an equally large decrease in Ti. The yield
curve and the credit spread (the parameters affecting the discount rate) are
calibrated to match the price of the bond. The bonds in the model will be
assumed to be traded at par. Using the par yield curve and the OAS data
(described in sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2) we can set the value equal to the face
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value, and then solve the equation for Di, which gives the coupon rate for
the bond when it is traded at par.
Let’s say we have ω investment grade bonds and ξ junk bonds at time t,
and that m=ω+ ξ, with a pre-determined distribution of different maturities
and coupons/face values for all bonds, reflecting the investment strategy of
the bank. For Bank J, this distribution will partly be one-period zero coupon
bonds, and bonds with longer maturity. The bonds with longer maturity will
be bucketed as bonds with one average maturity (called target maturity),
and an average coupon and principle payment. This assumption is made to
simplify the projections.
During the time period some bonds will migrate to a different credit
rating or default. For example, if an investment grade bond migrates to a
junk bond over one time period ∆, it will have the same coupon payment,
but will be discounted at a higher rate (with a different credit spread), thus
lowering the value of the bond as would be expected. It is also assumed that
no bonds are secured.
It is also important to model how to allocate cash (retained earnings
during the time period) to invest in new bonds at the start of the next time
period. For this reason it is important to track all cash flows that are coming
from the bonds during the time period. The cash flows are the pay-off coming
from coupons and principals, and the lost value from defaulted bonds. The
coupons and the lost value from defaulted bonds will be placed in the Profit
& Loss account. The principal payments are transfered directly to the cash
account, since this is not seen as profit or loss: it is just a cash flow (from
bonds to cash). The reason for this is that the increased amount of cash from
the principal equals the decreased value of the bond.
The lost value from defaults equals the exposure (EAD) multiplied by
the Loss Given Default (LGD), denoted δi(t) for [t, t + ∆], and the total
percentage of defaulted bonds. Each bond is mapped to an indicator function
Yi(t), which will be 1 if default has occurred during the time period [t, t+ ∆]
and 0 otherwise. It should be noted that for many bonds, it holds that
∑m
i=1 Yi(t)
m
≈ p13(t) + p23(t) (16)
which will be used in the tool, due to its deterministic nature. If the lost
value is denoted Rd it can then be expressed as:
Rd(t+ ∆) =
m∑
i=1
Yi(t)δi(t)vi(t+ ∆, Ti −∆, Di, fi). (17)
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By constructing sub-portfolios for investment grade bonds and junk bonds,
with values denoted vI(t) and vJ(t), and corresponding LGD of δI(t) and
δJ(t), the lost value can then be expressed as:
Rd(t+ ∆) = p13(t)δI(t)vI(t+ ∆) + p23(t)δJ(t)vJ(t+ ∆) (18)
The values of these portfolios is easily calculated as (assuming bonds have
been ordered with all investment grade bonds first):{
vI(t) =
∑ω
i=1 vi(t, Ti, Di, fi)
vJ(t) =
∑m
j=ω+1 vj(t, Tj, Dj, fj)
(19)
In reality, due to legal issues and other practicalities, it is not the case that
the recovered value from a defaulted counterparty can be obtained without
certain delays, but for simplicity this is assumed to be the case in the model.
Note that the market value of the bond in case of no default is used in
Eq. 17, which is needed since the value at the present time step is 0. This
method, called RMV, to estimate default exposure are suggested by Duffie
and Singleton[31]. If the bond would have matured at this time point, the
expected market value is set to the value of the principal fi plus the final
coupon payment Di.
The total value accounted for on the P&L, denoted RPL, is then
RPL(t+ ∆) =
(
m∑
i=1
(1− Yi)Di
)
−Rd(t+ ∆). (20)
The bonds that have not matured are assumed to be liquid and can there-
fore be traded at market price. They are valued according to Eq. 15. The
value of the bonds together with cash flows from principals and retained earn-
ings will be reallocated at the start of the next time period. The allocation
follows the chosen business plan. No trading costs are assumed.
5.6.2 Government bonds
The government bonds traded by Bank J are assumed to be high quality
bonds with practically no risk of default. This is a simplifying assumption
that could easily be altered, for example by applying the same model that
is used for the corporate bonds, with certain probabilities of ending up in a
defaulting state. The bonds therefore have a credit spread ci(t, T ) = 0 at
all times, and the cash flows will be discounted only by the risk-free yield
curve, y(t, T ). One could look at it as if the government bonds are assigned
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to a credit rating that is slightly better than the investment grade bonds,
and that they are in an absorbing state. This will give the same formula
as Eq. 15 when calculating the market value. In the same manner as for
the corporate bonds, the government bonds will be either zero coupon bonds
maturing at the end of the time period, or bonds with a target maturity.
The distribution of these is set to follow the chosen business plan by Bank J.
However, there are still several risks involved in holding the government
bonds. The biggest risk is drops in market value of the bonds due to rising
interest rates, i.e. a positive shift in the yield curve would decrease the
market value of the bonds (now having less attractive coupon payments).
The allocation of cash-flows will be coupons and principal payments, and
the coupons are accounted for on the Profit & Loss account. This amount
is, if the number of government bonds are n and the coupon payments are
Dj, equal to
RPL(t+ ∆) =
n∑
j=1
Dj. (21)
The bonds are, just as the corporate bonds, assumed to be liquid and
possible to trade at market price. The bonds, principals and coupons are
reallocated or reinvested at the start of the next time period.
5.6.3 Equity
The biggest risk in the equity portfolio is the volatility in the market value
changes. The market value of the equity portfolio is set to follow a deter-
ministic historical path (see section 5.4.4) that is reasonable considering the
scenario that is constructed. The growth of the portfolio will be determined
by the current business plan. The dividend yield is set to a constant percent-
age of the market value of the portfolio. The dividend yield will be accounted
for on the P&L account. The market value of the equity portfolio and divi-
dends will be reallocated at the start of the next time period, as it is assumed
that the equity portfolio is highly liquid.
5.6.4 Retail loans
The risk factors directly involved in the market values of retail loans in the
model are:
• Probability of Default
• Loss Given Default
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• Exposure At Default
• Duration of loans
• Migrations in customer quality
The retail loan portfolio can conceptually be thought of as the portfolio of
corporate bonds, with some differences. When modeling the loans, it is for
example not as easy to trade private customer loans as corporate bonds,
which will make the retail loan portfolio more static in its behavior. This
characteristic also makes it more complex to keep track of all the cash flows,
since the loan portfolio cannot simply be re-financed at the end of each time-
step as the corporate bond portfolio is assumed to be.
The retail loans are for practical reasons divided into two different parts,
existing (old) loans and new loans. They are all assumed to be unsecured, i.e.
no collateral is protecting the bank against default. The loans vary in matu-
rity dates, with a possibility of demanding higher loan rates for loans with
longer terms. This is for compensating for inflation risk (value of payments
vulnerable), interest rate risk, i.e. the risk of rising interest rates, making the
loans losing value. Also, the probability of default (not being fully re-paid)
rises when the term is longer. A long term loan is also making the bank vul-
nerable to liquidity risks; for example if the bank is not able to get enough
short term funding, or quick decreases in the deposit base, to cover long term
loans. Pre-payment risk, i.e. the risk of a customer re-paying the loan earlier
than agreed (leading to future losses in income) is not incorporated into the
model for simplifying reasons. The calibration for Bank J (see section 5.4.7)
suggests a flat loan rate curve, but this assumption can easily be altered in
the model.
The loans offered by Bank J will be structured as two types of loans; short
term loans and long term loans. The short term loans will have maturity Ts
years and the long term loans will have maturity Tl years, where Tl > Ts. Tl
will be set to 10 years and Ts to 2 years for the bank. The customer base
is divided into high quality customers and low quality customers. Compen-
sating for the extra risk induced by lending to low quality customers will
result in higher loan rates to these customers. The customer distribution at
t=0 will be consisting of γ high quality customer loans and φ low quality
customer loans, with total time period payments Ls,γ, Ll,γ, Ls,φ and Ll,φ.
The loans are normalized so that γ + φ = 1. In a similar fashion as for the
bonds, the retail loans will have a probability of defaulting, and also to shift
between the two rating classes. Let Wt define the credit rating of a loan at
time t and W = {Wt, t = 0,∆, 2∆, ...}. The Markov matrix describing the
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credit migrations is then defined as:
Q(t) =
 q11(t) q12(t) q13(t)q21(t) q22(t) q23(t)
0 0 1
 (22)
with qij(t) = P (Wt+∆ = j|Wt = i).
The behavior of the customers, in terms of credit quality, is assumed to
be time-dependent, but not dependent on the maturity of the loan or the
time that has elapsed since the loan was issued. As described in section 5.4.7
the loan rate will be fixed (which means that the rate will be held for the
remainder of the loans) and determined at each time point for new loans. It
will consist of the federal funds rate F (t) and a credit spread (spread between
the fed funds rate and prime loan rate/credit card loan spread) reflecting the
credit quality of the customer taking the loan (bγ(t, T ) and bφ(t, T )). In
total, if a short term loan worth N is granted to for example a high quality
customer, the following will be solved for Ls,γ:
N =
h·Ts∑
i=1
Ls,γ
(1 + F (t) + bγ(t, i/h))i/h
(23)
which will give the payment that will be made during each period (until
maturity). To get the effective interest that is paid it is just a matter of
subtracting the payment amount (Ls,γ) multiplied by the number of payments
(h · Ts) by the total amount of the loan (N). To get the rate in percentage it
is just a question of dividing this number by N.
The effective interest rate will be higher for longer maturities, since the
same (or higher) interest rate will be applied (see section 5.4.7) for a higher
number of payments and on a longer basis. For example, consider a loan
N=100, that is considered for either one period (one payment) and two peri-
ods (two payments). If the loan rate is 5 %, this will give a effective interest
rate for one period of r = (1.051/4 · 100− 100)/100 = 1.2%. For two periods,
it will be r = (2( 1
(1/1.051/4+1/1.052/4)
· 100)− 100)/100 = 1.8%, which illustrates
that the loan with longer term will have a higher effective interest rate even
for a flat loan rate curve.
Because of the fact that a customer that has migrated will have the same
loan rate, but a different credit quality, means that for valuation purposes
(see next section) it is needed to keep track of the credit quality when the
loan was issued. This means that the high quality customers will be divided
into two buckets, one that was considered high quality when the loan was
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issued and one that has migrated into low quality after the loan initially
was set. The same holds for the low quality customers, giving four types of
customers in total. It is, however, not affecting the transition matrix, since
it is assumed that a customer that has migrated to a specific rating will have
the same probabilities that a customer who initially were in the same rating
bucket. Otherwise this would have violated the Markov properties of the
matrix, which assumes that the probability of moving to a different state is
only dependent of the current state.
5.6.5 Old loans
The loans already existing in the portfolio will have known payments, and
these cash flows will be discounted by the future discount rates related to
a certain scenario to get the current market value. The whole portfolio of
old loans will have the same payments (within each group) for simplifying
reasons. The maturity dates are equally distributed among the old loans7.
This portfolio will be further divided into the four groups described in the
previous section. The notation will be done in the following manner: The
part of the loans that is currently low quality, but was high quality when it
was initiated, will be described by φt,γ. Consider the short term portfolio,
with initial distribution of loans:
High quality customers (high when initiated)
High quality customers (low when initiated)
Low quality customers (high when initiated)
Low quality customers (low when initiated)
 =

γt,γ
γt,φ
φt,γ
φt,φ

These loans will follow the Markov matrix Q. The value of this portfolio
can then be expressed as:
Vs(t) = 1(t < Ts)
1
(Ts − t)h
(Ts−t)h∑
i=1
i∑
j=1
(
Ls,γγt,γ + Ls,φγt,φ
(1 + bγ(t, i/h))i/h
+
Ls,φφt,φ + Ls,γφt,γ
(1 + bφ(t, i/h))i/h
)
(24)
where the indicator function tells that no old loans will be left when t = Ts.
The second term normalizes the amount of loans left by excluding matured
loans. The double summation works as follows: one part has one period
left with one payment and is discounted once, one part has two periods left
with two payments and is discounted twice, and so on. The payments are
calculated for the whole portfolio, i.e. they are the payments summed for
each group.
7For example, if the short term old loan portfolio consists of 2-year loans, and each
payment is made quarterly, 1/8 of the loans will just have one period to maturity, 1/8 will
have two periods and so on.
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During every time period [t, t+ ∆], a portion of the loans will end and a
portion of the loans will default or migrate to a different credit rating. The
distribution of loans will be updated according to this (after the allocation
of interest payments and default losses on the P&L account). If a loan has
defaulted in the time period [t, t+ ∆], an LGD of κγ(t) or κφ(t) of the total
value of the loan will be lost at t + ∆, depending on the credit quality at
time t.
To calculate the default losses the retail loan portfolio is divided into two
parts: one that is high quality at time t and one that is low quality at time
t. As seen in (22), the probabilities of these two groups defaulting is q13(t)
and q23(t) (independent of initial state). The value of these two portfolios is
denoted Vs,γ(t) and Vs,φ(t). These can be extracted from (24). The total lost
value, Rd, at the end of the time period is then
Rd(t+ ∆) = q13(t)κγ(t)Vs,γ(t) + q23(t)κφ(t)Vs,φ(t) (25)
To calculate the interest payments received at the end of the period, it will
use the distribution of loans that have not defaulted. The interest payment
part of the loan is equal to the actual payments minus the total amount of
the loan (N) divided by the number of payments (Tsh) and is, for loans that
were high quality as initial state, denoted:
Rs,γ = Ls,γ − N
Tsh
(26)
The distribution of loans will be updated as
γt+∆,γ = γt,γ(1− q13(t)− q12(t))
γt+∆,φ = γt,φ(1− q13(t)− q12(t))
φt+∆,γ = φt,γ(1− q23(t)− q21(t))
φt+∆,φ = φt,φ(1− q23(t)− q21(t))
(27)
The total payments from the whole short term loan portfolio, denoted
Rp, can then be expressed as
Rp(t+ ∆) = 1(t < Ts)
h · (Ts − t)
h · Ts ((γt+∆,γ + φt+∆,γ)Rs,γ + (φt+∆,φ + γt+∆,φ)Rs,φ) (28)
The indicator function again tells that no old loans will be left when
t = Ts. The second term tells how many of the equally large parts of the old
loans that has not matured. The P&L account will have interest payments
(the other part of the payment is just cash flows) on the plus side and lost
value of defaulted loans on the minus side at the end of each period, in total
(for the short term loans):
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RPL(t+ ∆) = Rp(t+ ∆)−Rd(t+ ∆) (29)
After this the distribution of loans will be normalized so that the sum is
equal to one. The same procedure as described above is then taking place
during the next time step. The long term portfolio will be treated in a
similar way, only with maturity time Tl instead. The amount of old loans in
the portfolio will be calibrated to the specific balance sheet that is studied.
5.6.6 New loans
New loans will be initiated at the beginning of each time period, both short
term and long term, with a predetermined distribution of the quality of the
loans. This distribution will be affected by the risk profile and strategy of
the bank. A total value of N is allocated to the loans, and the payments are
then calculated using the current federal funds rate and discount rates (see
Eq. 23). Since the short term and the long term loans will have a similar
behavior, it is enough to describe the short term loans. They will have a
structure similar to the old loans, with market value (for loans starting at
time point τ):
Vτ (t) = 1(t < τ + Ts)
(τ+Ts−t)h∑
i=1
(
Ls,γγt,γ + Ls,φγt,φ
(1 + bγ(t, i/h))i/h
+
Ls,φφt,φ + Ls,γφt,γ
(1 + bφ(t, i/h))i/h
)
(30)
The difference from the old loans is that the distribution will not be
normalized at each time step. It will just be updated in a similar fashion
as Eq. 27. The cash flows will also be similar to the formula for the old
loans. To get the overall market value of the loan portfolio, the values of all
sub-portfolios of both old and new loans are summed.
5.7 Liabilities
5.7.1 Deposits
The deposits are modeled as a stable source of funding, consisting only of
retail deposits. The risk involved is the volatility of the deposit rate and
the risk of rising deposit rates, which can be triggered by many factors, e.g.
the competition for retail consumers which has significantly increased since
the crisis, or a rising inflation rate which would force the bank to raise the
deposit rates.
The value of the deposits are set to increase or decrease by a percentage
each time period, reflecting the current scenario. The deposit rate are in the
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same manner set to capture the existing scenario. The deposit rate multiplied
by the present value of the deposits will be accounted for as a cost on the
Profit & Loss account.
5.7.2 Wholesale funding
Wholesale funding is modeled as Bank J borrowing money from the interbank
market. The amount of wholesale funding needed is projected as the gap be-
tween assets and liabilities (including Shareholders’ Equity) at the beginning
of each time step, making the two books to match. In other words, the bank
will raise the required amount of wholesale funding in order to finance loans
and trading assets at each time step.
The risk factor considered for wholesale funding is the risk of a liquidity
crisis, similar to the one during the financial crisis in 2008. The way of
capturing this risk is by raising the projected interest rate paid to investors,
thus making wholesale funding more costly. This will make a negative impact
on the Profit & Loss account, since the total amount of wholesale funding
multiplied by the cost of wholesale funding is registered as a loss there.
5.7.3 Share capital
Share capital is projected as an input parameter set by the bank, reflecting
the current business strategy under consideration. Under all plans the share
capital will be held constant, since it is assumed that the bank would not
consider issuing more shares. The reason for this is that it is considered to
be a big decision and something that would not be part of a regular business
plan.
5.7.4 Retained earnings (Profit & Loss account)
Retained earnings for one period are projected by using the final result from
the Profit & Loss account. The P&L account will include interest income
from loans and coupon payments from corporate and government bonds. It
will also consist of dividend payouts from the equity portfolio.
The total defaulted value of loans and bonds will also be registered on
the P&L account. The recovered value of these bonds and loans will be put
there as well.
The expenses from paying interest to depositors and investors through
wholesale funding will also be accounted for.
After the deduction of operating costs (salaries, rent for buildings, other
operating expenses) the bank will get the gross income for the period. The
operating costs will be modeled as an increasing function of the total value
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of the assets, since it is reasonable to assume that the bank will get higher
costs when expanding their business. The operating costs will be based on
values from Profit & Loss statements, and will increase or decrease by a small
percentage relative to the change in size of the assets. This reflect the fact
that a doubling in size of the assets is not equal to a doubling in operating
costs (many fixed costs will not change).
Then, taxes will be charged from the gross income, and the number used
(30 % if positive gross income, 0 otherwise) is taken from the balance sheet
data for the American bank that is the base for the projections (see section
6.1). After tax deductions, the net income is received.
Then the bank pays out dividends to its shareholders (zero if negative net
profit), which will be treated using recommendations in Basel III[1](see figure
15), which use the CET 1 ratio as input parameter, combined with a strategy
decision from the bank (a maximum set to 70 %). The resulting figure is the
retained earnings for one time period, which are added to the accumulated
retained earnings. This sum will be allocated as cash or in assets, which is a
decision dependent on the strategy of the bank.
Figure 15: Dividend payout rules in Basel III. The maximum dividend corre-
sponds to the complement of the number in the second column (100%-x)[1].
5.7.5 Reallocating assets/retained earnings at end of each period
After each time period trading assets and retained earnings will be reinvested
in assets, cash or redistributed as retail loans. Also, the bank may choose to
raise additional funds to buy more bonds/equity or lend more money to retail
customers. This will be managed in the tool as input parameters, where the
chosen inputs will reflect the business plan that is considered for Bank J.
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5.7.6 Default state
The bankruptcy state for the bank will be defined as
Share capital + Accumulated retained earnings < 0. (31)
This is because of the fact that the part of the liability side that is own
capital is Share capital and accumulated retained earnings. If own capital
becomes negative, the bank is in a defaulting state.
5.8 Risk-weighted assets
Before considering which business plans to stress test through scenario anal-
ysis, the risk-weighted assets used in the CET 1 ratio need to be projected.
The three risk charges used for calculating the risk-weighted assets are market
risk, credit risk and operational risk.
5.8.1 Market risk for Bank J
The capital charge for market risk for Bank J is calculated by using an
internal method (VaR) approach. The assets that are subject to the market
risk charge are the trading assets, which are the corporate bonds, government
bonds, equity and cash. Since cash can be considered to have almost zero risk
it will not be part of the model. The model will be based on the delta-normal
method, which is described below.
The delta-normal method (also called covariance-variance method) is the
simplest VaR approach and assumes that the risk factor changes are linear,
stationary and multivariate normally distributed. These assumptions are
often not fulfilled in practice[10], but it is assumed that the relatively simple
portfolio of the bank can be described by this model in an accurate way.
It uses the volatility of the different risk factor changes (yield curve, credit
spreads, equity index) and the correlations between them. The volatility
and correlation are calculated as described in section 5.4.5. The volatility
vector is scaled from 1-day to 10-day volatilities (required time horizon in
Basel) by multiplying with the square root of ten8. A matrix multiplication
generates the covariance matrix from the volatility vector and the correlation
matrix, denoted
∑
. Multiplying this with the vector of exposures x (which
has been multiplied by the Modified duration for bonds) gives the variance,
8The standard way of transforming a volatility to another time horizon is to multiply
by the square root of the relative time factor. For example, a 2-day volatility would be
translated into a 10-day by σ10 = σ2 ·
√
10
2 .
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σ2 = x’
∑
x. The square root of this value gives the standard deviation, σ.
Multiplying this value with 2.32, which is the 99 % quantile for the normal
distribution, gives the VaR for the portfolio.
This should then be compared to the average VaR of the last 60 days,
calculated in the same manner for each day and multiplied with a bank-
specific factor called k, which is set to 3(see Eq. 2). The larger of these
two should be applied as the market risk charge. To simplify things, the
calculated VaR number is used as the average VaR as well. An additional
stressed market risk charge is added as well, using data from the financial
crisis in 2008 as a stressed calibration period. Since the IRC charge deals with
assets exposed to liquidity risk, and the assets in the portfolio are assumed
to be highly liquid, no IRC charge is incorporated into the calculation.
Finally, a specific risk charge, CSR, is calculated using the standardized
method, which applies risk weights to the various assets in the portfolio
(specified by Basel). The bank can choose a combination of the internal
method approach and the standardized approach, or the supervisors can
impose such demands if parts of the internal model does not capture risks in
a sufficient way. The investment grade bonds receive a percentage weight of
0.25-1.6 % depending on the maturity of the bonds. The junk bonds receive
a risk weight of 8 % for all maturities. The equity portfolio gets a risk weight
of 8 % and the government bonds get a risk weight of zero, due to the low
risk associated with those assets. The market value of each group is then
multiplied with the corresponding risk weight and summed, which gives the
total specific risk charge.
The sum of the two VaR components and the specific risk charge gives
the total market risk charge for Bank J.
5.8.2 Credit risk for Bank J
The credit risk charge is applied to the assets in the banking book, which for
Bank J are the retail loans. The bank uses the advanced internal ratings-
based approach (A-IRB) and is assumed to estimate its own PD, LGD and
EAD numbers under certain scenarios and business plans. These numbers
differ for the high quality customers and the low quality customers and the
capital charges are therefore calculated and treated separately, giving two
charges for two portfolios, one for customers that are currently high quality
and one for customers that are currently low quality. These charges are then
added, which gives the total credit risk charge. The exposures (EAD) are
treated as being the current market value of the loans, as explained in section
5.6.4. The PD and LGD values are estimated as described in sections 5.4.6
and 5.4.3. The formula is
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
R = 0.03 ·
(
1−e−35·PD
1−e−35
)
+ 0.16 ·
(
1− 1−e−35·PD1−e−35
)
K =
(
LGD · Φ
(
(1− R)−0.5 · Φ−1(PD) +
(
R
1−R
)0.5
· Φ−1(0.999)
)
− PD · LGD
)
RWA = K · 12.5 · EAD
where the outputs are:
R - asset correlation,
K - capital requirement
RWA - risk-weighted assets
5.8.3 Operational risk for Bank J
Operational risk is calculated by using the Basic Indicator Approach (BIA,
see section 3.3.1), which uses the average annual gross income for the last
three years. In order to avoid distorted values, due to no positive income in
the last three years, a charge equal to the credit risk charge is applied if this
is the case.
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6 Testing business plans under different scenar-
ios
6.1 Initial portfolio of Bank J
The portfolio described in the previous section needs to be initiated with a
distribution of bonds, equity and loans. For this purpose, balance sheet data
from a U.S. bank called Wells Fargo is used. Annual statements of banks are
publicly available and free to use. Since the balance sheet data (see Appendix
C) consists of more asset classes than Bank J, the various assets are grouped
within the existing asset classes in the portfolio. The rules applied for this
can be studied in Appendix C. The resulting portfolio is seen in table 1. The
bank was rated A+ by S&P at the end of 2012, which will be Bank J’s initial
rating in the scenarios.
Table 1: Balance sheet of Bank J (B$)
Assets Value %
Government bonds 184 12.9
Corporate bonds 140 9.9
Equity 57 4.0
Cash 102 7.2
Retail loans 939 66.0
Liabilities Value %
Deposits 1002 70.5
Wholesale funding 262 18.4
Share capital 81 5.7
Retained earnings 77 5.4
6.2 Business plans
In the following subsections four different business plans considered for the
bank are presented. The plans describe different ways of allocating assets in
the portfolio for the next five years. Under all business plans, the distribution
between short term and long term bonds will be 50 % and the target maturity
is set to 10 years. The loans will be divided equally into short term and long
term loans as well. This is to enable a more robust discussion of the results.
All plans except Plan 2 will have an equal number of high quality and low
quality customers for the retail loans.
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6.2.1 Plan 1 - Keeping current portfolio structure
Under the first plan, the bank simply holds its current portfolio allocation
and aims at keeping it constant in size. This will be referred to as Plan 1.
6.2.2 Plan 2 - Increasing trading portfolio
Under this suggested plan, the bank increases its trading portfolio by approx-
imately 15% annually during the 5 year horizon and is targeting a constant
size in value of the retail loan portfolio, making the loans less important
and going in a direction towards an investment bank portfolio. An annual
increase of 15 % corresponds to approximately a doubling in size of the trad-
ing portfolio over five years. Also, the bank will move towards riskier assets
(more junk bonds and equity). The bank will increase its corporate bond
portfolio from 10 % to around 25 % and allocate 90 % of this to junk bonds.
It will also increase the equity portfolio from 4 % to 14 %. The bank will
target more low quality customers (around 60 % of retail loans) in order to
reach higher returns. To achieve this expansion, the bank will raise more
wholesale funding during the time period.
6.2.3 Plan 3 - Increasing retail loan portfolio
Under this plan the bank instead relies more on retail loans and expands
its retail loan portfolio by around 15 % on an annual basis during the 5
year horizon, targeting a structure closer to a retail bank portfolio. The
trading portfolio will be kept constant and is focusing on safer assets, such as
government bonds. The retail portfolio will go from initial 66 % to around 80
% and the government bonds will be more than 50 % of the trading portfolio.
This plan also involves a more aggressive approach on the interbank market.
6.2.4 Plan 4 - Aggressive growth agenda
Under this approach the bank is increasing the whole portfolio by around
15 % annually, targeting a total expansion of around 100 % for the five year
plan. The reason for this is to win market shares in order to get a bigger
influence on the level of loan rates and funding costs. The distribution of
assets will be the same as for Plan 1, and the size of the portfolio is the
changing parameter.
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6.3 Scenarios
Stress testing under ICAAP involves evaluating the impact of extreme, but
plausible, scenarios. Therefore, a key issue is how to select these scenarios,
since it often involves a certain degree of subjectivity. Stress testing can be
done by stressing individual variables, as a sudden decrease in equity index
or a 100-basis-point shift in the yield curve. It can also involve stressing
several risk factors at once, since this often is the case in reality. When one
risk factor makes a sudden change, it is very likely that other risk factors
will do as well. Another option is to let management construct scenarios,
involving expert judgement to a large extent.
The scenarios can also be based on historical periods of significant stress.
This is the approach in the construction of scenarios in this thesis. The nature
of this challenge lies in the fact that history never repeats itself exactly. For
example, people involved in trading try to avoid making the same mistakes
as those causing earlier recessions and huge losses. The solution to this is
to base the scenarios on past events, but to include some key aspects of the
current financial situation. The objective is to capture the spirit of historical
downturns, and still keep it consistent with the world we see today.
One of the biggest issues with stress testing and "what if"-scenarios is the
problem of assessing a probability to a certain scenario. Even if the model
that projects the assets and liabilities is calibrated in a good way, it is still
not telling us anything about the probability of occurrence of the event. The
solution is often to use expert judgement to estimate this probability.
Three 5-year scenarios will be constructed; one base case scenario, which
is treated as how the future could possibly evolve under normal market con-
ditions where no stresses occurs, and two historical time periods. The first
one captures the climate of the period 2000-2004, under which the dot-com
bubble in 2000 and events like the 9/11 attacks made significant impacts on
the U.S. market in 2002 and 2003. The second one uses historical data from
the period 2005-2009, which involves the financial crisis in 2008.
All three periods will use market conditions as today as a starting point
and then evolve differently over time.
6.3.1 Scenario 1 - Base Case Scenario
The Base Case Scenario will be treated as if the current financial climate
is continuing in the same manner for the next five years. The short term
Treasury rate will continue to be low (it has been around 0.1 % the last 4
years). The yield curve between 2009 and 2013 can be seen in figure 16. The
credit spreads will, as during the last 4 years, vary between 1.5 and 2.5 %
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for investment grade bonds and 5 to 7 % for junk bonds (see figure 17).
Figure 16: Yield curve for U.S. Treasury bonds on a quarterly average basis
between 2009 and 2013. As can be seen, the yield curve has kept a similar
shape with low rates for short maturities.
Figure 17: Credit spread for U.S. Treasury bonds for Base Case Scenario.
The funding costs for wholesale funding will be low, around 0.2-0.3 %
yearly, and the deposit rate is set to a constant value of 0.1 %. The bank is
assumed to keep its current credit rating (A+) throughout the period. The
credit quality of the corporate bonds will be described by a migration matrix
that has low Probability of Default for both investment grade and junk bonds
(see Eq. 32 for quarterly averages). The probabilities are based on historical
observations under normal market conditions. The matrix will move with
low variability around these numbers during the scenario.
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P =
 99.55% 0.4% 0.005%0.9% 98.7% 0.4%
0 0 100%
 (32)
Loss Given Default is set to 30 % for both retail loans and corporate
bonds. The annual discount rate is around 3 % for high quality customers
and 10 % for low quality customers, and the loan rates slightly above those
numbers, with a margin equal to the federal funds rate. The migration matrix
will be set to a constant matrix (see Eq. 13), as described in section 5.4.3.
The volatilities and correlations involved in the market risk charge will
be set to numbers similar to those observed under normal market conditions.
6.3.2 Scenario 2 - Early 2000’s Recession (2000-2004)
The second scenario deals with the period from 2000 to 2004, which involves
the burst of the Dot-com bubble in 2000 and the recession that followed.
The scenario will focus on the things that happened after the bubble. This
scenario simulates the effects of a similar recession in the near future.
In 2000 the yields on bonds were high; for example the yield on 3-month
U.S. T-bills were around 5-6 %. The yields declined during the recession, and
in 2004 the 3-month yield on the same type of bond was around 1 %. The
yields on short term U.S. T-bills are today close to zero. To create a scenario
that would be consider plausible, but yet extreme, a burn-in period of one
year is introduced, where the yields rises quickly and reaches a level of around
4-5 %. Then they follow the historical data points from the period 2001-2004.
The historical yield levels are plotted in figure 18. The credit spreads had a
similar level back in 2000 compared to today, and will be set to values given
from historical data. They varied between 1-2 % for investment grade bonds
and between 3-10 % for junk bonds (see figure 19).
The Probability of Default was high (close to 3 % quarterly) for junk
bonds during 2001 and 2002, which reflects the significant stress that was
endured. In 2003 and 2004 the probabilities declined as a result of the econ-
omy recovering from the recession. The probability of default for investment
grade bonds were quite low (0.01-0.06 %) during the whole period, but the
migration probabilities from investment grade to junk bonds more than dou-
bled (from 0.5 % to 1.1 % quarterly) from 2000 to 2002. They decreased
during 2003 and 2004, just as the default probabilities for junk bonds did.
The PD values in the scenario are set to the same numbers as the historical
values. Loss Given Default in this particular scenario is, for both bonds and
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Figure 18: Yield curve for U.S. Treasury bonds on a quarterly average basis
between 2000 and 2004. As can be seen, the yield curve went from a quite
flat shape with high interest for low maturities to a more steeper shape from
2002 and forward.
Figure 19: Credit spread for U.S. Treasury bonds for Early 2000’s Recession
scenario.
retail customers, set to 30 % in the first year, then an increase to 50 % in
year 2 and 3, and ending in 30 % during the 4th and 5th year.
The discount factor for retail loans is just as in the Base Case Scenario
set to 3 % for high quality customers (the spread between the prime rate and
the federal funds rate during 2000-2004) and 10 % for low quality customers
(average credit card rate over federal funds rate). Probability of Default will
be the same as under the Base Case Scenario, but with a doubled PD under
the second and third year, which are the stressed years in the scenario. The
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second component of the loan rate, which is the federal funds rate, was at a
significantly higher level in 2000 than it is today, which should be adjusted
in a similar fashion as the yield curve. The reason for this is that they are
closely related. The federal funds rate can be viewed as the target lending
rate set by the government, and the yield curve as the borrowing rate (U.S.
Treasuries are issued to raise funds). Therefore, the federal funds rate will
be raised to historical levels during a one-year burn-in period. Regarding
the actual probability of the U.S. Federal Reserve quitting the zero-interest
rate policy that has been the strategy since the crisis, no investigations are
made. This could perhaps eliminate the scenario as a plausible one, but that
is a question to be evaluated by management and experts. Let’s make the
assumption that the scenario is in fact plausible, but extreme.
The federal funds rate is then increased during the first year, to 4 %, and
then follows historical values of a steady decline during a recession down to
1 % in three years followed by an increase in the 5th year. The credit rating
of the bank will migrate to BBB+ in year 2 and 3, but advance in rating
to a final score of A in year 5. The total funding costs for the scenario are
plotted in figure 20. The deposit rate is around 0.5 % on an annual basis.
Figure 20: Annual funding cost rate for Bank J under Scenario 2 - Early
2000’s Recession.
The volatilities and correlations of assets in the trading portfolio are fol-
lowing historical estimates (see Appendix A). The equity portfolio will move
like the historical data shows in figure 13, with a rapid decrease in the first
two to three years, and then a growth when the market recovers from the
recession.
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6.3.3 Scenario 3 - Financial Crisis (2005-2009)
The third scenario uses historical inputs from the years leading up to the
financial crisis in 2008 and the aftermath in 2009. This involves the housing
bubble (including subprime-mortgage crisis) that escalated in 2007 and the
following financial crisis that affected the whole economy. Another cause
of the crisis was the increased leverage that financial institutions took on
as credit was easy to obtain. An increase in off-balance sheet leveraging,
which is a way of banks to move assets of the balance sheet in order to meet
capital requirements, enabled banks to keep this heavy leveraging process
in place. Also, the creation and misuse of complex financial assets such as
CDO’s, which contained low quality mortgages, and CDS’s, which is an in-
surance contract that protects the lender against default of the borrower, led
to further degeneration of the stability of the economy. The decreased trust
among banks led to a unwillingness to lend, which created major liquidity
issues during the crisis.
The yield curve during the years leading up to the crisis shows an inter-
esting shape (see figure 21). There is a hump in the curve during 2006 and
2007, which usually is an indicator of a recession. As can be seen, there is
a big drop in the curve during 2008 and 2009 for low maturities when the
crisis peaked. This can be interpreted as a typical flight to quality-response
by the market. When market volatilities rise a search for safer and more
liquid assets is regarded as expected. The increased demand, and price, for
these kinds of assets leads to a decrease in yields. Another explanation for
the structure of the yield curve for short term bonds is the connection to the
federal funds rate, which increased and decreased in a similar manner during
the same period, which can be seen in figure 14.
The yield curve is, just as for Scenario 2, adjusted in the beginning to
fit the current yield curve. The credit spreads show a significant increase
during the crisis (see figure 22), but have initial values that can be considered
reasonable. The bond default probabilities increase from 0 % to 0.05 % for
investment grade bonds during the scenario and from 0.4 % to 2.8 % for
junk bonds (aligned with historical data). LGD for both corporate bonds
and government bonds are set to 30 % during the first three years and then
stressed to 50 % during the last two.
The retail loan customers have a spread of 3 % and 10 %, just as in the
other scenarios. This is in line with historical data. Probability of Default
will be doubled during the stressed years and is therefore raised from 0.3
% to 0.6 % for high quality customers and 1.3 % to 2.6 % for low quality
customers. The migration probability from high to low quality is doubled as
well, from 1 % to 2 %. The federal funds rate will grow fast in the beginning
66
Figure 21: Yield curve for U.S. Treasury bonds on a quarterly average basis
between 2005 and 2009. The yield curve has a hump in its shape during 2006
and 2007, indicating a future recession.
Figure 22: Credit spread for U.S. Treasury bonds for Financial Crisis sce-
nario.
and then decline during the crisis, with an added peak during autumn 2008
(increased TED spread) as a way of capturing the liquidity crisis. The bank
will migrate from A+ to BBB gradually during the scenario, which will also
increase the funding costs. The funding costs can be seen in figure 23. The
deposit rate is around 0.5 % annually.
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Figure 23: Annual funding cost rate for Bank J under Scenario 3 - Financial
Crisis.
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7 Results
The results show the risk metrics under the three scenarios and the four
business plans.
7.1 Scenario 1 - Base Case Scenario
The risk metrics for the Base Case Scenario should confirm that the bank
has a viable structure under at least some of the proposed business plans.
The risk metrics for the first business plan - to keep the current structure of
the portfolio and a constant size - are shown in figure 24. It shows that all
risk metrics are performing well with no breaches. The CET 1 ratio is close
to the upper limit at the end, indicating that the approach may be too risk
averse.
(a) CET 1 ratio (b) Return on Equity
(c) Leverage ratio (d) NSFR
Figure 24: The risk metrics under Scenario 1 - Base Case Scenario and Business Plan
1 show that all four risk metrics are within limits.
The second business plan - to double the size of the trading portfolio
during a 5-year horizon - shows the resulting risk metrics in figure 25. Since
the trading assets are shifting towards more risky assets (especially equity),
this will have an impact both on returns and on the CET 1 ratio. The
projected returns are higher than for Business Plan 1 and the CET 1 ratio
is lower.
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(a) CET 1 Ratio (b) Return on Equity
(c) Leverage ratio (d) NSFR
Figure 25: The risk metrics under Scenario 1 - Base Case Scenario and Business Plan
2 show that three out of four risk metrics are within limits. Only one is below, which is
the CET 1 ratio, and it is just breaching the lower limit at the end of the scenario.
(a) CET 1 Ratio (b) Return on Equity
(c) Leverage ratio (d) NSFR
Figure 26: The risk metrics under Scenario 1 - Base Case Scenario and Business Plan
3 show that three out of four risk metrics are within limits. The only metric that is outside
limits is the NSFR, which is breaching the lower limit.
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The third plan - to double the retail loan portfolio during the 5-year
projection period - is shown in figure 26. It shows that the NSFR is breached
at the end of the period, and this is due to the high weight that is applied
for retail loans (85-100 %). The plan will, however, give good results when
it comes to capital adequacy. This can be concluded from the CET 1 ratio,
which is close to the upper limit and is showing values around 14 %.
The fourth plan is the aggressive growth agenda, which aims at doubling
the size of the whole portfolio during a 5-year time horizon. The resulting
risk metrics can be seen in figure 27. ROE shows a positive trend, but the
other three risk metrics decreases during the scenario. This is to expect, as
a quick increase in growth often implies a bigger reliance on debt.
(a) CET 1 Ratio (b) Return on Equity
(c) Leverage ratio (d) NSFR
Figure 27: The risk metrics under Scenario 1 - Base Case Scenario and Business Plan
4 show that all four risk metrics are within limits. Return on Equity shows a good trend
but the CET 1 ratio and the NSFR are decreasing and are close to the lower limit and the
end of the period.
7.2 Scenario 2 - Early 2000’s Recession
The risk metrics for Scenario 2, Early 2000’s Recession, is presented below.
The resulting risk metrics for the first business plan can be seen in figure 28.
There is a breach of the ROE metric and this is during the stressed period
similar to the years 2001 and 2002. The other three risk metrics are within
limits during the whole period.
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(a) CET 1 ratio (b) Return on Equity
(c) Leverage ratio (d) NSFR
Figure 28: The risk metrics under Scenario 2 - Early 2000’s Recession - and Business
Plan 1 show that three out of four risk metrics are within limits. The only breach is for
ROE, which goes below the lower limit during the second and third year.
(a) CET 1 Ratio (b) Return on Equity
(c) Leverage ratio (d) NSFR
Figure 29: The risk metrics under Scenario 2 - Early 2000’s Recession - and Business
Plan 2 show that two out of four are within limits. ROE is breached during years 2-3, but
the values are just below zero. The CET 1 ratio is being breached during years 3-5.
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The second business plan shows the resulting risk metrics in figure 29.
The CET 1 ratio goes slightly below the lower limit during years 3 to 5, due
to a significant increase in the market risk charge. The ROE is breached;
however it is close to keeping a positive return during every quarter for the
whole period. The Leverage ratio and the NSFR are within limits during the
entire 5-year period.
In figure 30 we can see the results from the third plan; to increase retail
loans by 100 % in five years. It shows that the portfolio endures significant
stress in terms of ROE and NSFR. The proposed plan could potentially lead
to negative income during year 2 and 3, but a good revenue during year 4
and 5.
(a) CET 1 Ratio (b) Return on Equity
(c) Leverage ratio (d) NSFR
Figure 30: The risk metrics under Scenario 2 - Early 2000’s Recession - and Business
Plan 3 show that two out of four risk metrics are within limits. ROE reaches values around
-10 % during the stressed years and NSFR is around 90 % at the end of the period, which
is due to the expansion of retail loans, affecting the ratio negatively. The CET 1 ratio is
above target at the beginning of the scenario.
The fourth plan, the aggressive growth agenda approach, is shown in
figure 31. ROE is similar to the results for Business Plan 3, but the CET
1 ratio is significantly more stressed under this plan. The Leverage ratio
reaches values below target and is down at 6 %, but the bank still meets its
regulatory requirements. NSFR shows a decreasing trend and is below the
lower limit at the end of the period.
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(a) CET 1 Ratio (b) Return on Equity
(c) Leverage ratio (d) NSFR
Figure 31: The risk metrics under Scenario 2 - Early 2000s recession - and Business
Plan 4 show that two out of four risk metrics are within limits. ROE is far below its lower
limit during year 2 and 3 but goes above target during year 4 and 5. CET 1 ratio and
Leverage ratio start above target but both go below and are close to the lower boundary at
the end of the period. NSFR breaches its lower limit at the end of the period.
7.3 Scenario 3 - Financial Crisis
The risk metrics for Scenario 3, Financial Crisis, are presented below. The
risk metric results for Business Plan 1 are shown in figure 32. The only risk
metric limit that is breached is the lower limit for ROE. This corresponds
to the stressed part of the scenario, namely the years corresponding to 2008
and 2009.
The second business plan - to increase the trading portfolio and go into a
direction of more risky assets - shows the resulting risk metrics in figure 33.
The CET 1 ratio is breached during the last two years, due to the larger share
of risky assets and riskier retail loan customers, which affects the market risk
charge and the credit risk charge in a negative way. ROE is breached at
the end of the period, but is making good revenue during the crisis. The
Leverage ratio is above target and the NSFR is above or just below target
during the 5-year horizon.
The third plan, which involves an expansion of the banking book as well
as more investments in safer assets such as government bonds, can be seen
in figure 34. It shows that the portfolio is exposed to big losses, with ROE
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(a) CET 1 ratio (b) Return on Equity
(c) Leverage ratio (d) NSFR
Figure 32: The risk metrics under Scenario 3 - Financial Crisis - and Business Plan 1
show that three out of four are within limits. ROE is breached at the end of the period,
which is when the stressed part of the scenario is taking place.
(a) CET 1 Ratio (b) Return on Equity
(c) Leverage ratio (d) NSFR
Figure 33: The risk metrics under Scenario 3 - Financial Crisis - and Business Plan 2
show that two out of four are within limits. ROE is breached in year 5, but is making good
revenue during year 4. The CET 1 ratio is breached during years 4 to 5.
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values close to -20 %. One explanation to this could be that the increased
amount of retail loans, increased funding costs (the retail loan portfolio is
66 % of the portfolio and a 100 % increase leads to a significant increase in
wholesale funding) and increased probabilities of default of retail customers
together make a huge impact on the P&L account.
(a) CET 1 Ratio (b) Return on Equity
(c) Leverage ratio (d) NSFR
Figure 34: The risk metrics under Scenario 3 - Financial Crisis - and Business Plan
3 show that one out of four is within limits. ROE reaches values near -20 % at the peak
of the crisis and NSFR is around 85-90 % at the end of the scenario. The CET 1 ratio
is close to the upper limit at initial years, but just below the lower limit at the end of the
period.
Business Plan 4 - Aggressive Growth Agenda - is shown in figure 35. This
plan fails to meet the lower limits in three out of four metrics, and is under
5 % for the Leverage ratio, which is close to the minimum requirements of 3
% in Basel. Return on Equity is showing large negative returns during the
end of the period. NSFR maintain values above the lower limit during year
4, but fail to meet its limits during year 5. The CET ratio breaches its lower
limit after the third year. This approach would be considered as too risky
under the Financial Crisis scenario.
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(a) CET 1 Ratio (b) Return on Equity
(c) Leverage ratio (d) NSFR
Figure 35: The risk metrics under Scenario 3 - Financial Crisis - and Business Plan
4 show that just one out of four is within limits and all four are below target. There is
significant losses in ROE during year 4 and 5. The Leverage ratio is above the lower limit,
although quite close to a breach at the end of the scenario.
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8 Conclusions
The scenarios demonstrate a differentiation for different business plans, and
the risk metrics could together serve as a good indicator base for identifying
potential excessive risk taking. One is focusing on capital adequacy, one on
returns, one on amount of non self-financed debt and one on stability of debt.
These take into account many of the risks relevant to a domestic bank.
8.1 Scenario 1 - Base Case Scenario
The first scenario, the Base Case Scenario, is just as expected not breaching
the lower limits of the the risk metrics to a large extent under any of the
proposed business plans. It shows a potentially too risk averse approach for
Plan 1. This is to expect since Plan 1 is the most modest plan with no aim
of growth or reallocations towards riskier assets.
For Plan 2, it is projecting good returns but is also challenging the cap-
ital requirements. This is in line with what could be expected for a more
investment focused portfolio under normal market conditions.
The third plan, to increase retail loans, is projecting good returns as well
as very good CET 1 ratios. This is the result from a low credit risk charge
under normal market conditions. The amount of stable funding (NSFR)
decreases due to the rapid growth of wholesale funding under this scenario
and the high weight applied for retail loans when calculating the NSFR. The
weight is high due to the illiquid nature of retail loans.
Business Plan 4 shows a decrease in the Leverage ratio and NSFR, and
this is also due to an aggressive growth of wholesale funding. Deposits are
assumed to follow GDP, which makes relatively small changes, and therefore
it is wholesale funding that is the growing part of the liabilities. However,
the more diversified approach with an increase of both trading assets and the
banking book, can be interpreted as an explanation to why all risk metrics are
within limits. All four plans are fulfilling the Leverage ratio requirements,
which confirms that the positive ROE trend is complemented by a sound
distribution of equity and debt. This is also a sign that the bank has good
expanding possibilities based on its current liability structure.
8.2 Scenario 2 - Early 2000’s Recession
The second scenario, Early 2000’s Recession, shows some interesting results.
All four plans have a similar shape when it comes to ROE, but Plan 1 and
Plan 2 are absorbing losses in a better way during the stressed years. Business
Plan 1 also manages to keep the other three risk metrics within limits, and can
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therefore be considered the most suitable plan to follow under this scenario.
Plan 2 also displays good results with better returns than Plan 1 and just a
small breach of the CET 1 ratio. The lower ROE for Plan 1 is due to the
fact that the portfolio consists of less risky assets, but this pays off in terms
of the other three risk metrics, with more stable funding and lower amount
of Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA).
Plan 3 has a breach in ROE and NSFR. For ROE, this could be explained
by the high probability of default for both high quality and low quality cus-
tomers, leading to large default losses, in combination with increased funding
costs due to a greater reliance on wholesale funding. As far as NSFR is con-
cerned, it is quite intuitive that this ratio is breached. A bank that doubles
its retail loans, with an illiquid nature with long maturities, and at the same
time raises large amounts of wholesale funding, which is considered as less
stable than deposits, is most certainly affecting its NSFR in a significant way.
Plan 4 demonstrates a larger stress of the Leverage ratio than under the
Base Case Scenario, which is due to losses in retained earnings, affecting
the self-financing part of the liabilities. It exhibits more balanced results in
terms of the CET 1 ratio and the NSFR than Plan 2 and 3. This can be
attributed to the diversification of the portfolio. Also, the market risk charge
is affecting the CET 1 ratio to a larger extent.
8.3 Scenario 3 - Financial Crisis
The third scenario, Financial Crisis, is also presenting some quite interesting
results. Plan 1 is not stressed at all when it comes to the Leverage ratio and
NSFR, which is to be expected when no growth is taking place. The funding
base, with stable deposits as core source, keeps the NSFR at a stable level
and the size of the assets combined with quite stable accumulated retained
earnings keeps the Leverage ratio at a constant and stable level as well. The
CET 1 ratio is not stressed but is lowered a bit, due to increased probability
of default for retail loans (affecting the credit risk charge) and increased
volatilities and correlations in the trading book (affecting the market risk
charge). ROE is negative during the end of the stressed period, but compared
to Plan 3 and 4, it shows no significant losses.
Plan 2 is breaching the CET 1 ratio during the end of the period, due to
high volatilities and exposures for equity and junk bonds, affecting the market
risk charge. At the same time quite good, but varying, ROE numbers are
recorded. The primary reason for this is the increased returns on junk bonds
during the crisis, with huge credit spreads. A delay in losses due to defaults
at the same time could explain why this is the case. It can also be explained
by a potentially large liquidity premium in the credit spreads, which is not
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captured in the default probabilities.
Both Plan 3 and 4 show significant losses during the stressed period that
corresponds to 2008 and 2009. The main reason for this is the huge losses
that stems from the increasing default probabilities of retail loans and the
increased funding costs, just as for Scenario 2. Opposed to the case with junk
bonds, no extra spread is applied in the model to compensate for an increase
in PD. This is motivated by the potential difficulty of quickly raising the
spread, which might offset customers and lead to a decrease in the customer
base. The significant losses also lead to a decrease in own equity, which has
a negative impact on the Leverage ratio. The same conclusions about NSFR
made under Scenario 2 hold for Scenario 3.
8.4 Final conclusions
The scenarios support Plan 1 and 2 to a greater extent than 3 and 4. The
results do however support a diversified business plan with both trading
and lending activities. The model is capturing downturns in the scenarios
in a good way, but in order to validate if the quantification of the losses are
realistic, one would need more data and an adaptation to operations of a real
bank. The results could inspire the management of the bank to investigate
a set of new business plans, and then test them in a similar procedure. The
framework presented in this thesis should work as an iterative process, where
both the results from the risk metrics and the choice of risk metrics itself are
discussed and developed on a daily basis. The models should be validated
through backtesting and by using internal data from the bank.
The obvious risk in using risk metrics that follow regulatory standards is
that they may create incentives for banks to build their strategies in a certain
way in order to meet requirements. This could lead to a gaming environment,
where banks find ways of maximizing the ratios through various loopholes or
special ways of grouping or labeling assets. If banks do this in a similar way,
the regulation itself could create a risk of similar movements among banks
on the market.
Another risk with regulatory risk metrics is that banks estimate the pa-
rameters themselves. This could lead to biases in the estimation of important
regulatory parameters, such as PD or LGD. This is where it is important that
supervisors make thorough controls of the internal models in Basel.
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9 Discussion of improvements
One of the central parts of building scenarios based on the model is the cali-
bration of the many input parameters, such as PD, LGD, EAD, funding costs
etc. The assumptions made for some of these parameters when constructing
the scenarios are appropriate for an average bank, but may not reflect any
specific bank in reality. When using the model in a real bank, such param-
eters can be estimated in a better way, and then also help validating the
model and find out what to improve or change. Due to the use of generic
market data for many important parameters, such as the discount rate and
probability of default for retail customers, the possibility of validating the
results in a good way are quite hard. This makes the model to be mainly a
theoretical one, but with further development and calibration it could serve
as a helping tool when evaluating business plans at a bank.
The model is deterministic, which could be seen as focusing on a few
possible paths in a Monte Carlo simulation. To make it more dynamic, a
natural continuation would be to develop a stochastic model based on the
same structure and principles. One way of doing this could be to fit distri-
butions, with a possible correlation structure, to the different parameters,
based on data from the bank, and then let them be based on some macro-
economical parameters that describe the current financial situation.
Another improvement could be to investigate other risk metrics, to see if
they can capture other risks involved in the business plans of the bank. It
could also be interesting to build some kind of optimization scheme, which
finds the optimal business plan that stays within limits during all scenarios.
The VaR model that is applied is the Delta-Normal method. In practice
this is a quite weak approach for several reasons. It is for example often the
case that the distribution of the risk factors are more heavy-tailed than the
normal distribution. An improvement could be to try to fit other distribu-
tions to the risk factor changes. An improvement could also be to investigate
other, more forward-looking, approaches to measuring Value-at-Risk. This
could for example involve the development of a GARCH-model.
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Appendices
A Volatility and correlation in trading book
A.1 Volatility of risk factors in trading book
Table 2: Daily volatility in percent (every quarter) 1998-2012 using 1-year
rolling historical data window for S&P 500 index, 3-month and 10 year U.S.
Treasury yield and OAS credit spreads for U.S. investment grade bonds and
junk bonds.
Quarter Equity Credit spread inv Credit spread junk Yield 3m Yield 10yr
1998 - 1 1.12% 0.02% 0.04% 0.04% 0.05%
1998 - 2 1.10% 0.01% 0.04% 0.04% 0.05%
1998 - 3 1.05% 0.01% 0.04% 0.04% 0.05%
1998 - 4 1.31% 0.02% 0.06% 0.05% 0.05%
1999 - 1 1.22% 0.03% 0.07% 0.06% 0.05%
1999 - 2 1.31% 0.03% 0.07% 0.06% 0.06%
1999 - 3 1.36% 0.03% 0.07% 0.06% 0.06%
1999 - 4 1.13% 0.03% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06%
2000 - 1 1.13% 0.02% 0.05% 0.05% 0.06%
2000 - 2 1.19% 0.02% 0.05% 0.05% 0.06%
2000 - 3 1.31% 0.02% 0.05% 0.06% 0.06%
2000 - 4 1.25% 0.02% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05%
2001 - 1 1.38% 0.01% 0.07% 0.07% 0.05%
2001 - 2 1.35% 0.02% 0.08% 0.07% 0.05%
2001 - 3 1.31% 0.02% 0.09% 0.07% 0.05%
2001 - 4 1.38% 0.03% 0.12% 0.08% 0.06%
2002 - 1 1.25% 0.03% 0.13% 0.06% 0.07%
2002 - 2 1.10% 0.03% 0.13% 0.05% 0.07%
2002 - 3 1.30% 0.03% 0.13% 0.05% 0.07%
2002 - 4 1.55% 0.03% 0.12% 0.03% 0.07%
2003 - 1 1.62% 0.03% 0.12% 0.02% 0.07%
2003 - 2 1.68% 0.03% 0.12% 0.02% 0.07%
2003 - 3 1.48% 0.02% 0.10% 0.03% 0.07%
2003 - 4 1.14% 0.02% 0.09% 0.02% 0.07%
2004 - 1 0.97% 0.01% 0.08% 0.02% 0.07%
2004 - 2 0.79% 0.01% 0.08% 0.02% 0.07%
2004 - 3 0.70% 0.01% 0.07% 0.02% 0.06%
2004 - 4 0.69% 0.01% 0.06% 0.02% 0.06%
2005 - 1 0.68% 0.01% 0.05% 0.02% 0.05%
2005 - 2 0.66% 0.01% 0.06% 0.03% 0.05%
2005 - 3 0.65% 0.01% 0.06% 0.03% 0.05%
2005 - 4 0.65% 0.01% 0.06% 0.03% 0.04%
2006 - 1 0.63% 0.01% 0.06% 0.03% 0.04%
2006 - 2 0.58% 0.01% 0.05% 0.03% 0.04%
2006 - 3 0.66% 0.01% 0.04% 0.03% 0.04%
2006 - 4 0.61% 0.01% 0.04% 0.02% 0.04%
2007 - 1 0.59% 0.01% 0.04% 0.02% 0.04%
2007 - 2 0.65% 0.01% 0.04% 0.02% 0.04%
2007 - 3 0.71% 0.01% 0.06% 0.03% 0.04%
2007 - 4 0.88% 0.01% 0.07% 0.10% 0.04%
2008 - 1 1.09% 0.02% 0.09% 0.11% 0.06%
2008 - 2 1.22% 0.02% 0.11% 0.13% 0.07%
2008 - 3 1.28% 0.02% 0.11% 0.12% 0.07%
2008 - 4 2.27% 0.06% 0.20% 0.13% 0.08%
2009 - 1 2.58% 0.07% 0.24% 0.12% 0.09%
2009 - 2 2.75% 0.07% 0.26% 0.11% 0.09%
2009 - 3 2.75% 0.08% 0.27% 0.11% 0.10%
2009 - 4 1.90% 0.04% 0.19% 0.02% 0.09%
2010 - 1 1.49% 0.03% 0.15% 0.01% 0.08%
2010 - 2 1.10% 0.02% 0.10% 0.01% 0.07%
2010 - 3 1.14% 0.02% 0.09% 0.01% 0.06%
2010 - 4 1.10% 0.02% 0.09% 0.01% 0.06%
2011 - 1 1.06% 0.02% 0.09% 0.01% 0.06%
2011 - 2 0.93% 0.01% 0.07% 0.01% 0.06%
2011 - 3 1.14% 0.02% 0.09% 0.01% 0.07%
2011 - 4 1.37% 0.03% 0.11% 0.01% 0.07%
2012 - 1 1.43% 0.03% 0.11% 0.01% 0.06%
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A.2 Correlation between risk factors in trading book
Table 3: Linear correlation coefficient 1998-2012 (every quarter) using 1-year
rolling historical data window for S&P 500 index, 3-month and 10 year U.S. Trea-
sury yield and OAS credit spreads for U.S. investment grade/junk bonds.
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1998 - 1 0.11 0.15 -0.21 0.27 0.03 0.01 -0.25 0.04 -0.71 0.3
1998 - 2 0.17 0.09 -0.22 0.21 0.01 -0.03 -0.16 0 -0.76 0.29
1998 - 3 0.23 0.07 -0.32 0.21 0.01 -0.13 -0.04 -0.01 -0.76 0.35
1998 - 4 0.27 0.03 -0.33 0.41 -0.29 -0.46 0.3 -0.06 -0.71 0.43
1999 - 1 0.21 0.06 -0.27 0.22 -0.2 -0.4 0.26 -0.09 -0.63 0.28
1999 - 2 0.19 0.07 -0.25 0.25 -0.21 -0.38 0.24 -0.11 -0.65 0.27
1999 - 3 0.15 0.06 -0.24 0.25 -0.19 -0.3 0.15 -0.12 -0.68 0.26
1999 - 4 0.1 0.08 -0.23 0.07 0.01 0.01 -0.14 -0.06 -0.68 0.21
2000 - 1 -0.07 0.02 -0.21 0.37 -0.1 0.12 -0.26 -0.03 -0.77 0.28
2000 - 2 -0.11 0.01 -0.23 0.38 -0.02 0.12 -0.22 -0.04 -0.75 0.31
2000 - 3 0.01 -0.02 -0.15 0.33 -0.08 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.71 0.23
2000 - 4 0.02 0.02 -0.06 0.35 -0.05 -0.08 0.06 -0.09 -0.68 0.18
2001 - 1 0.06 0.01 -0.11 0.39 0.01 -0.13 0.16 -0.2 -0.62 0.17
2001 - 2 0.1 0.03 -0.11 0.41 -0.12 -0.28 0.3 -0.2 -0.63 0.18
2001 - 3 0.04 0.02 -0.19 0.31 0 -0.27 0.27 -0.1 -0.56 0.27
2001 - 4 0.13 -0.18 -0.42 0.46 -0.04 -0.3 0.34 -0.16 -0.59 0.37
2002 - 1 0.17 -0.24 -0.52 0.45 -0.06 -0.3 0.26 -0.21 -0.63 0.41
2002 - 2 0.19 -0.28 -0.57 0.46 -0.06 -0.27 0.2 -0.26 -0.63 0.41
2002 - 3 0.24 -0.27 -0.56 0.5 -0.13 -0.25 0.28 -0.29 -0.63 0.39
2002 - 4 0.14 -0.05 -0.28 0.5 -0.13 -0.23 0.36 -0.22 -0.6 0.37
2003 - 1 0.22 0.02 -0.24 0.57 -0.2 -0.36 0.56 -0.21 -0.57 0.38
2003 - 2 0.22 0 -0.23 0.59 -0.21 -0.41 0.63 -0.22 -0.56 0.37
2003 - 3 0.23 -0.03 -0.24 0.68 -0.22 -0.48 0.59 -0.22 -0.63 0.39
2003 - 4 0.18 -0.05 -0.25 0.63 -0.29 -0.48 0.47 -0.27 -0.68 0.35
2004 - 1 0.11 -0.19 -0.25 0.57 -0.19 -0.36 0.35 -0.3 -0.75 0.32
2004 - 2 0.02 -0.1 -0.23 0.51 -0.08 -0.23 0.16 -0.24 -0.75 0.3
2004 - 3 -0.15 -0.05 -0.16 0.49 -0.09 -0.14 0.05 -0.24 -0.75 0.25
2004 - 4 -0.06 -0.11 -0.19 0.45 -0.14 -0.22 0.18 -0.26 -0.77 0.28
2005 - 1 -0.06 -0.12 -0.21 0.44 -0.19 -0.19 0.09 -0.25 -0.73 0.29
2005 - 2 -0.04 -0.12 -0.22 0.47 -0.28 -0.19 0.03 -0.21 -0.7 0.26
2005 - 3 0.02 -0.16 -0.21 0.4 -0.21 -0.2 0.12 -0.17 -0.67 0.26
2005 - 4 -0.01 -0.14 -0.21 0.41 -0.18 -0.18 0.02 -0.16 -0.67 0.26
2006 - 1 0.08 -0.18 -0.23 0.45 -0.14 -0.15 -0.01 -0.18 -0.67 0.29
2006 - 2 0.1 -0.18 -0.22 0.36 -0.11 -0.17 0.07 -0.2 -0.69 0.31
2006 - 3 0.05 -0.19 -0.27 0.4 -0.12 -0.08 -0.03 -0.24 -0.73 0.29
2006 - 4 0.03 -0.17 -0.27 0.39 -0.12 -0.06 -0.07 -0.23 -0.7 0.29
2007 - 1 -0.11 -0.08 -0.2 0.34 -0.13 -0.03 -0.1 -0.24 -0.74 0.24
2007 - 2 -0.06 -0.11 -0.24 0.63 -0.15 -0.14 -0.01 -0.4 -0.75 0.27
2007 - 3 -0.07 -0.15 -0.23 0.63 -0.15 -0.21 -0.02 -0.39 -0.74 0.24
2007 - 4 0.11 -0.29 -0.27 0.72 -0.29 -0.43 0.3 -0.47 -0.71 0.15
2008 - 1 0.15 -0.33 -0.31 0.73 -0.31 -0.5 0.44 -0.47 -0.72 0.22
2008 - 2 0.2 -0.37 -0.34 0.7 -0.31 -0.49 0.51 -0.43 -0.74 0.32
2008 - 3 0.22 -0.36 -0.35 0.71 -0.31 -0.51 0.57 -0.41 -0.74 0.32
2008 - 4 0.36 -0.45 -0.45 0.62 -0.23 -0.48 0.57 -0.3 -0.72 0.39
2009 - 1 0.26 -0.37 -0.32 0.73 -0.18 -0.38 0.46 -0.23 -0.4 0.3
2009 - 2 0.24 -0.37 -0.31 0.73 -0.15 -0.33 0.4 -0.2 -0.36 0.24
2009 - 3 0.22 -0.36 -0.26 0.73 -0.16 -0.31 0.36 -0.2 -0.36 0.18
2009 - 4 0.18 -0.24 -0.22 0.75 -0.15 -0.29 0.33 -0.16 -0.35 0.12
2010 - 1 0.06 -0.1 -0.14 0.65 -0.13 -0.22 0.26 -0.12 -0.43 0.13
2010 - 2 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.63 -0.2 -0.25 0.23 -0.21 -0.56 0.13
2010 - 3 0.17 -0.05 -0.08 0.72 -0.42 -0.49 0.49 -0.33 -0.64 0.17
2010 - 4 0.15 -0.07 -0.09 0.77 -0.44 -0.59 0.57 -0.4 -0.72 0.15
2011 - 1 0.12 -0.09 -0.09 0.75 -0.45 -0.58 0.53 -0.37 -0.71 0.12
2011 - 2 0.14 -0.09 -0.11 0.76 -0.45 -0.59 0.49 -0.39 -0.75 0.11
2011 - 3 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.69 -0.35 -0.53 0.43 -0.38 -0.77 0.02
2011 - 4 -0.02 0.11 0.02 0.76 -0.33 -0.47 0.42 -0.34 -0.72 0.06
2012 - 1 -0.02 0.07 0 0.84 -0.38 -0.52 0.57 -0.41 -0.7 0.08
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B Spread for cost of wholesale funding
Spread added to funding costs with respect to credit rating. As can be seen,
the spread is added to the T-bill rate. The federal funds rate and the T-bill
rate are relatively close in value, which makes it a reasonable assumption to
be able to add it to the federal funds rate as well.
Figure 36: Empirical spread added to funding costs based on credit rating[16].
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C Balance sheet data and mapping rules
The balance sheet data used is fetched from the annual statements fromWells
Fargo & Company (see figure 37). The rules applied for grouping assets are
the following:
• Government bonds: Federal funds sold
• Corporate bonds: Other assets
• Equity: Trading Assets
• Cash: Cash and due from banks, Premises and equipment, net and
Goodwill
• Retail loans: Mortgages held for sale, Loans held for sale, Mortgage
servicing rights
• Deposits: Total deposits
• Wholesale funding: short term borrowings, Accrued expenses and other
liabilities, Long term debt
• Share capital: Equity (minus retained earnings)
• Retained earnings: Retained earnings
Securities available for sale are technically not part of neither the banking
book nor the trading book and is therefore spread as 2/5 to retail loans,
1/5 to cash, 1/5 to government bonds and 1/5 to corporate bonds (chosen
arbitrarily).
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Figure 37: Balance sheet data for Wells Fargo[41].
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D Capital Planning Tool
In this section a short description of the Capital Planning Tool developed in
Excel/VBA is done, with some screen shots of the tool.
The tool enables the user to control the scenarios and the business plans
through two input sheets, where risk factors involved in the scenarios are
defined (see figure 38) and the various strategy decisions in the business
plans are defined. A third sheet is then used as a terminal where it is easy to
switch between business plans and scenarios, and also to apply specific risk
factor shocks, as a shift in the yield curve or a change in the credit spread
(see figure 39).
The overall development of the balance sheet and the value of the assets
and liabilities can be studied in two separate sheets, which capture the sit-
uation at the start of each time period and at the end of each time period.
A screen shot of the start period sheet can be seen in figure 40. The end
period sheet is needed to be able to structure the reallocation process regard-
ing funding allocation and the reallocation of trading assets. The end period
sheet is also used as input to the calculation of some of the risk metrics. A
separate sheet is describing the P&L account, which also is used in the risk
metric calculations. An example of the P&L sheet can be seen in figure 41.
All asset and liability groups have a separate sheet for their projections,
and the risk charges have separate sheets as well. The details regarding these
projections can be studied in section 5.5.
Risk appetite is treated in a separate sheet, where limits and targets for
the risk appetite measures are defined by the user. In the same sheet the
output from the risk metrics is shown and plotted with the limits and targets.
One example can be seen in figure 42.
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Figure 38: Screen shot of the risk factor input sheet.
88
Figure 39: Screen shot of terminal sheet where scenarios, business plans and
specific risk factor changes are controlled.
89
Figure 40: Screen shot of the balance sheet projections at the start of each
period.
90
Figure 41: Screen shot of the P&L account.
91
Figure 42: Screen shot of the risk metric results.
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